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Abstract 
The first chapter investigates how corporate governance influences firms’ capital 
structure behavior. Based on the premise that costs associated with deviations from the target 
capital structure are positively correlated to the extent of deviation, we hypothesize that the 
initial deviation from the target will be shorter for a firm with good corporate governance than 
for a firm with poor corporate governance. We also hypothesize that the former group will 
employ a higher speed of adjustment towards target than the latter group due primarily to the 
following reasons. First, a firm with well-placed governance system will adjust at a faster rate 
because longer it stays deviated, the higher the loss of value it faces. Second, firms with better 
governance structures enjoy lower adjustment costs. We develop three sets of measures for the 
quality of corporate governance and analyze how they influence a firm’s rebalancing behavior in 
presence of relevant control variables. Our results are consistent with the hypotheses.  
The second chapter explores investors’ reactions to new information on REITs and non-
REITs option markets. The real estate market can be fairly volatile; what remains unclear is 
whether price changes are excessively volatile relative to fundamentals. This study attempts to 
examine the latter by using the methodology based on Stein (1989), which utilizes option data. 
The advantage of using option data rather than stock data to assess the reactions to information is 
that option valuation is not affected by changes in risk premium. Under volatility mean reversion, 
the changes in implied volatilities of long-term options should be less than those of short-term 
options. If not, an excessive reaction is suggested. Specifically, the study compares the changes 
in implied volatilities of options on REITs and non-REITs. Because real estate transactions 
typically involve a great degree of leverage, reactions can be greater for REITs than for non-
REITs; on the other hand, there are several reasons that REITs are subject to potentially a lower 
x 
 
degree of excessive reactions. Empirical results indicate that the reactions to information are 
stronger in non-REITs than in REITs. Moreover, we find that down markets are associated with 
stronger reactions, which we argue might be due to a leverage effect. 
 
Keywords: Capital Structure, Partial Adjustment Process, Corporate Governance, Principal 
Component Analysis, REITs, Option Valuation, Volatility Mean Reversion 
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CHAPTER 1: DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT THE 
ADJUSTMENT SPEED TOWARDS TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE? 
 
I. Introduction 
The tradeoff theory implies that, in the absence of adjustment costs, a firm should quickly 
move towards its optimal capital structure since any deviation from the target results in the cost 
of not adjusting (bankruptcy costs rising at an increasing rate with deviation) exceeds the benefit 
from not adjusting (tax shield from debt), thus reducing the firm value.  In presence of 
adjustment costs, the dynamic version of the tradeoff theory suggests that a firm should 
rebalance its capital structure when benefits from adjustment exceed adjustments costs. In this 
paper, we posit that with or without adjustment costs, a firm with a strong corporate governance 
system in place will be motivated to stay close to the target as it minimizes the loss of value of 
the firm stemming from the deviation. Additionally, we posit that this firm will be quicker, than 
its weakly-governed counterpart, to adjust a deviation due to two primary reasons. First, the 
longer a firm remains deviated from the target, the larger the loss of value to the firm. Second, a 
well-governed firm by better aligning the interests of managers with those of the stakeholders 
would be able to reduce the agency costs of issuing debt and equity. Moreover, self-interested 
managers tend to take advantage of private information to maximize their own benefits, and 
good governance would mitigate the problem and bring about more timely and informative 
disclosures, reducing information floatation costs of external capital. Therefore, a firm with good 
governance system is more likely to be associated with lower costs of capital structure 
adjustments. As a result, we hypothesize that a firm with better quality of corporate governance 
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is likely to stay closer to the target capital structure and will employ a higher speed of adjustment 
(SOA) than its counterpart with a poorer quality of governance.  
Our paper falls in the strand of partial adjustment literature that argues that while firms in 
aggregate exhibit partial adjustments toward their target capital structures, their speed of 
adjustment (SOA) could vary depending primarily on some inherent firm characteristics. Based 
on preliminary evidence of partial adjustment, Jalivand and Harris (1984) pioneer the 
investigation, arguing that factors like firm size and capital market conditions influence the speed 
through adjustment costs. About two decades later, Fama and French (2002) estimate SOAs for 
dividend payers and non-dividend payers separately. Byoun (2008) links leverage adjustments 
with firms’ financing needs, finding that over-leveraged (under-leveraged) firms rebalance more 
actively when they are faced with a financial surplus (deficit).  Lockhart (2010) obtains 
heterogeneous SOAs across groups sorted by credit line (with or without), leverage deviation 
(positive or negative), and firm’s financial needs (positive or negative).  Faulkender, Flannery, 
Hankis and Smith (2011) hold that a firm is more likely to adjust their capital structure when 
large cash flow realizations lead to external financing or fund distribution, which saves the firm a 
special trip to the capital market and hence lower the costs of leverage adjustment. They find a 
positive relation between the magnitude of cash flows and SOA. Mukherjee and Wang (2012) 
propose that firms with larger deviations from their leverage target would adjust faster. They 
present empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis.  
Since the factors that affect a firm’s corporate governance system (and the quality thereof)  
are not straight forward, we measure the quality  in the following three ways: (1) use several 
proxies (for examples, board independence proxies, managers’ compensation package, and 
ownership concentration) that have been used in the corporate governance literature; (2) create a 
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governance index specifically related to capital structure decisions; and (3) employ  the Principal 
Component Analyses in a conceptual implications framework and obtain a comprehensive 
measurement of the corporate governance quality.  
The results show that the quality of the governance system is one of important determinants 
of the deviation from the target as well as how quickly the deviation is removed.  We produce 
further support to our initial finding by showing that the two extreme leverage deviation groups 
are dominated by firms with weak governance. We also show that the SOA is higher for the 
firms that are blessed with a better quality of governance system. In addition, we find that well-
governed group employs a significantly higher SOA than its weakly-governed counterpart in 
narrowing the deviation in both severely underleveraged and overleveraged situations.  
The balance of this paper proceeds as follow. Section II discusses previous literature on the 
partial adjustment process of capital structure, the measure of corporate governance, relevant 
governance in the rebalance process, and hypotheses development. Section III describes the data, 
methods, and variable definition. Section IV presents results of hypotheses. Section V 
summarizes and concludes.   
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II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
II.1 Capital structure theory and partial adjustment process 
A widely used empirical specification in capital structure is the partial adjustment model. 
Suppose that optimal level of debt exists, there must be some costs for firms to adjust to the 
target. The tradeoff theory implies that, if  there are no adjustment costs, a firm has incentive to  
quickly rebalance its capital structure towards the target leverage, while, if adjustment costs are 
unlimited, the firm will have no incentive to adjust. Accordingly, if adjustment costs are between 
the two extremes, firms may temporarily deviate from their target capital structures. In other 
words, size of adjustment costs may be the main determinant of the speed toward the targets. 
Partial adjustment model for the most part assumes that firms have the same adjustment speed 
toward their target.1 Researchers approximate the model via pooled OLS estimation, fixed effect 
estimation, General Method of Moments estimation, and other sophisticated estimations. The 
existing literature shows a slow speed of adjustment from 7% in Fama and French (2002) to 36% 
in Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
While some studies do not support the view of target leverage ratio convergence 
(Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Welch, 2004), the bulk of the capital 
structure literature produce evidence that  firms adjust their capital structure to the optimal level 
(Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Hovakimian, Opler, Titman, 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 
                                                 
1 The idea of partial adjustment has been tested by several studies, for example, Jalivand and Harris (1984), Fama 
and French (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Flannery and Rangan (2006). The literature points to a 
widespread but on average fairly slow mean reverting speed in firms’ capital structure adjustment behavior. The 
speed ranges from 7% in Fama and French (2002) to 36% in Flannery and Rangan (2006). Besides empirical 
evidence, recent survey evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001) suggest that, although most believe that target exists, 
achieving such ratio is not their primary concern. 
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2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith, 2011; Mukherjee and 
Wang, 2012). The concept of target capital structure is based on static tradeoff hypothesis that a 
tradeoff of the costs (financial distress and agency conflicts) and benefits (tax shield) of leverage 
is the determinant of target debt-equity ratio of a firm. One can expand the traditional tradeoff 
theory into a general form, the dynamic tradeoff theory—applying cost-benefit analysis in capital 
structure theory—which is, firms rebalance their capital structures only when adjustment benefits 
outweigh adjustment costs (Leary and Roberts, 2005).  Adjustment costs in this sense could 
include financial distress costs of debt, the cost of informational asymmetries (pecking order 
theory) or the time-varying relative costs of equity and debt (market timing story). 
A smaller strand of the partial adjustment literature argues that the rebalancing process is 
heterogeneous depending on some inherent firm characteristics (for examples, Jalilvand and 
Harris, 1984; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001; Byoun, 2008; Lockhart, 2010; Mukherjee 
and Wang, 2012). Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) document that the 
SOA is affected by firm distinctiveness, such as firm size and capital market conditions, so it is 
company-varying and time varying. Fama and French (2002) contend that dividend policy is a 
determinant of a firms’ capital structure and examine the SOAs for dividend payers and non-
dividend payers separately. Byoun (2008) observes that most rebalance actions happen when 
firms have above-target debt with a financial surplus. Lockhart (2010) discovers heterogeneous 
speed of adjustment in the rebalance process by sorting credit line, leverage deviation, and firm’s 
financial needs. Mukherjee and Wang (2012) propose that initial leverage deviations across firms 
play an essential role in capital structure rebalancing behavior. They find that there is a positive 
relation between SOA and the degree of deviation from the target. They also report that, for the 
same degree of deviation, an overleveraged firm employs a higher SOA than its underleveraged 
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counterpart. Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (FFHS) (2011) assert that cash-flow 
realizations decreases the marginal cost of adjustment and affect SOAs. 2 
In this study we extend the capital structure literature by introducing the influence of 
corporate governance to the heterogeneous speed of adjustment studies. We examine how 
corporate governance system affects initial deviation from target leverage and whether 
governance mechanisms help firms raise adjustment speed toward target.  
II.2 Literature on corporate governance measurement 
The fundamentals of corporate governance can be traced since 1976 when Jensen and 
Meckling formally introduced the role of corporate governance in aligning interests of owners 
and managers (Denis, 2001). Viewed as a set of contracts with stakeholders, firms are operated 
by the management (the agents) on behalf of shareholders (the principals). The separation of 
ownership and control brings significant agency costs to modern businesses. Thus, it is 
imperative that managers of publicly-held companies are motivated to purse the goal of 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth and disciplined when they deviate from this goal. A good 
corporate governance system is a widely accepted vehicle to make this happen.3 For example, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) depict corporate governance as a mechanism to resolve agency 
problem in “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment.”  
                                                 
2 Although Leary and Roberts (2005) do not explicitly estimate SOAs, their evidence implies heterogeneous speeds. 
They examine the equity and debt issuance/repurchase activities, and find that firms wait shorter to increase 
(decrease) leverage if their leverage is relatively low (high), if their leverage has been decreasing (accumulating), or 
if they have recently decreased (increased) their leverage through past financing decisions. 
3  Corporate governance is hard to define. For example, Denis (2001) admits that “a truly complete and 
representative definition of Corporate Governance can be elusive,” Anand (2007) in his book, Essentials of 
Corporate Governance, suggests that “Corporate governance is a broad and complex concept that incorporates 
almost every aspect of corporate life.” 
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The term “corporate governance,” however, is hard to define.  Consequently, the scope of 
corporate governance comprises too broad and one cannot find any single mechanism to 
represent it. A comprehensive governance system recognized in literature generally includes 
internal and external governance. Jensen (1993) suggests four basic controls to force managers’ 
decisions converging to the optimal level of firms. They are (1) the capital markets, (2) the legal, 
political, and regulatory system, (3) the product and factor markets, and (4) the internal control 
system headed by the board of directors. Denis (2001) uses these categories to review the theory 
and evidence of corporate governance and renames them as (1) external control mechanisms, (2) 
legal and regulatory mechanisms, (3) product market competition, and (4) internal control 
mechanisms.  
Gillan (2006) develops a boarder corporate governance system and depicts the complicated 
relationship among stakeholders: shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, and suppliers. 
The framework provided by Gillan provides wider perspective and incorporates some 
nontraditional elements of corporate governance structures. He essentially separates all 
mechanisms into two sets, the internal and external governance. The internal governance issue 
includes the board of directors related topics, managerial incentives, capital structure, bylaw and 
charter provisions or antitakeover measures, and internal control systems. The external 
governance can be split into five groups: law and regulation, capital markets (related to the 
market for corporate control, labor markets, product markets), the providers of capital market 
information, the services from external parties (such as auditing, investment banking 
advice…etc.), and private sources of external oversight (particularly the media and external 
lawsuits). Although this body of literature presents a thorough governance scheme, the lines 
dividing the groups are not clear.  Also, many of the determinants of corporate governance do 
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not have direct implications for a firm’s capital structure decision. Section III and Appendix 1 
provide a discussion of the corporate governance factors that we believe are more relevant to a 
firm’s capital structure decisions.  
II.3 Hypotheses development  
Two testable questions that we pose in this study are as follows. Does the quality of 
corporate governance affect the extent to which a company deviates from its target capital 
structure? Does the quality of corporate governance affect a firm’s speed of adjustment toward 
its target capital structure? Specifically, we a) investigate the relation between firms’ initial 
deviation and governance quality, and b) examine whether a firm’s speed of adjustment is related 
to the quality of the governance system it has in place. A good corporate governance system is 
expected to promote the alignment of interests of the management with those of shareholders, 
with an eye to maximization of their wealth. The tradeoff theory suggests that any deviation from 
the optimal capital structure leads to a less than the optimal firm value. The further the capital 
structure from the target, the greater is the value loss from not adjusting as costs (for example, 
bankruptcy costs in case of an overleveraged firm) increase at a much higher rate than benefits 
(for example, tax shield in case of an overleveraged firm). Consequently, a well-placed 
governance system, relative to a poorly-placed governance system, has greater incentive to stay 
closer to the target.  Thus, we first hypothesize that the leverage deviation from target across 
firms depends on the quality of corporate governance, the firm with stronger governance system 
having smaller divergence from the target than its weaker counterpart. This hypothesis prevails 
even in the absence of adjustment costs. 
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We further posit that the longer a firm stays deviated from the target, the higher is the 
present value of the value losses it sustains. This potential prompts the firm with stronger 
governance to take corrective actions at a faster rate than its weaker counterpart. Also, since a 
good governance system is considered to be more effective in reducing agency costs and 
promoting transparency, 4  it is likely that a well-governed firm will be able to lower its 
adjustment costs relative to a firm that has a poor governance system. Thus, our second 
hypothesis is as follows: A firm with superior governance system will employ a higher SOA than 
a firm with weaker governance.   
  
                                                 
4 For more the connection between corporate governance and information quality, see Forker (1992), Xie, Dividson, 
and Dadalt (2003), Liu (2003), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2007). 
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III. Data, Variable Definition, and Methodology  
III.1 Measure of Capital Structure 
Welch (2007) criticizes the major issue in previous capital structure studies that people 
misuse capital structure proxies. He suggests and define market debt-to-capital ratio as follows:  
tititi
ti
ti
PSFD
FD
ML
,,,
,
,


,                                                                                                           (1) 
where ML is the market debt ratio of firm i, FD is financial debt of firm i, S equals the 
number of common shares outstanding of firm i, P denotes the price per share of firm i. This 
specification avoids a non-financial-liabilities-to-asset ratio and ensures that the denominator is 
financial capital correspondent to financial debt rather than total assets. Thus, we define the 
market leverage as total debt (short-term and long-term debt) divided by the sum of market 
equity and debt. To develop the model to measure how corporate governance affects the speed of 
adjustment (SOA) toward target leverage, we discuss historical homogeneous partial adjustment 
model and heterogeneous partial adjustment model first. 
The partial adjustment model can be traced from the study of traditional financial statement 
analysis. Lev (1969) proves that financial ratios adjust to their industrial means in a slow speed 
employing a Koyck-Nerlove partial adjustment model. A standard partial adjustment model is 
broadly used not only on the research of financial statement analysis (Lev, 1969; Gallizo and 
Salvador, 2003, among others) but also on many capital structure studies (Jalilvand and Harris, 
1984; Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and 
Ritter, 2009, among others). Applying this idea to dynamic tradeoff theory in finance field, the 
speed of adjustment to target debt ratio depends on the cost of leverage adjustment. Empirical 
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evidence shows that leverage presents mean reversion using partial adjustment models (Jalilvand 
and Harris, 1984; Fama and French, 2002). The basic partial adjustment model can be addressed 
by following equations: 
ititititit LevLevLevLev 
~)( 1
*
1                                                                                    (2) 
where Levit is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of year t, 
*
itLev  is the target leverage and 
λ is the SOA. When λ=1, the adjustment is instantaneously completed. Since *itLev  is 
unobservable, equation (2) presents a latent specification for target leverage depending on firm 
characteristics (Xit) related to the costs and benefits of operating debt: 
1
*
 itiit XLev                                                                                                                  (3) 
The homogeneous SOA estimation is to put equation (2) and (3) together in a reduced form 
specification5. A pooled OLS estimation first runs into most prior researchers’ mind. However, 
the estimator ignores firm-specific effects and serial correlation in the error structure, which is 
biased in general dynamic panel (Hsiao, 2003). The pooled OLS approach excludes initial 
leverage and assumes that the errors are possibly heteroskedastic and equicorrelated within firms 
(Petersen, 2009). Recently, Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimate a dynamic panel model 
considering fixed effects across firms and allowing each firm’s target debt ratio to change over 
time. Lemmon et al. (2008) observe leverage ratio not only present a significant amount of 
convergence over time but also are remarkably stable over time. Accordingly, they argue a time 
invariant target for leverage ratio and use system generalized method of moments (GMM) to 
reveal a less extreme estimate of the speed of adjustment, in between the estimation of the 
                                                 
5 For example, in Flannery and Rangan (2006)’s study, they substitute equation (3) into equation (2) and rearrange a 
new equation as 
itititit YXY 
~)1(   
and thus all firms may have the same speed of adjustment, λ, under this 
specification. 
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pooled OLS and firm fixed effect. However, all the models imply that firms in the sample have 
the same adjustment speed toward their target.  
The heterogeneous SOA studies offer a two-stage procedure for estimation. They 
approximate equation (3) in the first step to get the target leverage ratio. The target leverage ratio 
is the debt ratio that firms would choose in the absence of adjustment costs. To model a target 
debt ratio in equation (3), we use a set of firm characteristics that appears widely in the literature 
including: the log of sales, market-to-book ratio, profitability, asset tangibility, cash flow 
volatility, and whether or not the firm pays dividend. Firm characteristics are winsorized at the 
top and bottom one-percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers and eradicate errors in the data. 
We employ a Tobit regression with double censoring to estimate equation (3) whose dependent 
variable is censored from zero to one6.   
The second step is the main SOA estimation using equation (2). Mukherjee and Wang 
(2012) propose that how far away the firms’ starting deviation from the target is a determinant of 
SOA and decompose SOA into two factors: the baseline speed (soa.a) which is the homogenous 
part of SOA, and the speed caused by firms’ starting deviation (soa.a) which is the 
“heterogeneity factor”. Their model shows as follow: 
itititjitit DevDevbsoaasoaLevLev 
~|)|..(1                                                                   (4) 
where i is a firm-specific index, t is a year, 1
*
 ititit LevLevDev  is the target deviation, and 
|Devit| represents the magnitude of starting deviation from the target leverage. Therefore, 
following the heterogeneity SOA literature, our estimations involve two stages described by 
equation (3) and (4).  
                                                 
6  To avoid the look-ahead bias, we estimate the model in a year-by-year manner. One potential problem in 
estimating equation (3) in a Tobit model is the heteroscedasticity in residuals. This problem can result in biased and 
inconsistent estimators if the sample contains a lot of zeros and ones. However, the market leverage ratios in our 
sample have only a few zeros, so the biased estimation problem in a Tobit regression should not serious in this study. 
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To test how corporate governance affects the initial deviation from target leverage (|Dev|), 
we specify a model as follow.  
ititjiit GovDev  ||                                                                                                       (5) 
where Govit is governance variable for firm i at time t and  j is the number of governance 
proxies. Our main focus is on coefficient βj. If a firm has a strong governance system to support, 
then its divergence from the target should be shorter  and βj is expected to be negative.  
Following the heterogeneity SOA literature, this study test hypothesis 2 in the model below:  
itititkititjititit DevGovcsoaDevControlbsoaaDevsoaLevLev 
~)(.)(..1                  (6)
 
Where Levit denotes the leverage ratio of firm i at time t; Devit measures the projected deviation 
of debt ratio from the target of firm i at time t where the target leverage is estimated from 
equation (4); Govit are proxies of corporate governance defined next part; j is the number of 
control variables; Control are control variables of firm i at time t, such as initial deviation 
(Mukherjee and Wang , 2012), cash flow realizations (FFHS, 2011), firm size (Jalilvand and 
Harris, 1984), and dividend (Fama and French, 2002). We use OLS to estimate equation (6) to 
get an unrefined result. In this model, our major concern is soa.c, the SOA caused by corporate 
governance.  
III.2 Measure of corporate governance 
Corporate governance system is multidimensional. We have enclosed relevant governance 
mechanisms related to corporate debt-equity decisions in Section II. It is difficult to use any 
single mechanism to represent the whole status of governance in a firm.  In this section, we 
employ three ways which normally used in previous studies to determine the governance system 
of a firm as follows.   
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1. Individual governance proxies 
In early corporate governance research, people generally utilize only one or few governance 
indicators to stand for whole governance system. Some general flaws appeared in previous 
corporate governance research that studies either simply aggregate several variables to represent 
different features of governance mechanism or only focus on some variables belonging to one 
aspect. All of them are not likely to be suitable methods to measure the governance structure of a 
firm and further may create measurement error in their analyses (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 
2007, hereafter LRT). Besides, it is possible that some individual governance variables are 
highly correlated. If researchers ignore the interrelationship among governance measures, their 
studies might fall into spurious inferences (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bowen, Rajgopal, and 
Venkatachalam, 2008). To minimize the possible constraints of this method, we define relevant 
governance mechanisms which affect corporate debt-equity decisions and we place two highly 
correlated governance measures into two different regressions.  
The relevant governance variables in this study comprise three groups: (1) board 
independence (proportion of outside directors), leadership structure (duality), and board size, (2) 
managerial incentive package (includes stock rewards, options grants and bonus compensation), 
and (3) ownership concentration variables (institutional ownership and blockholders). We 
measure the composition of the board as the percentage of outside directors on the board (PctOut) 
representing the monitor function. PctOut is winsorized at 99%. Since outside directors are 
generally considered to be independent from management, the board composed by higher 
percentage of outside directors may be more effective in monitoring management. The variable 
DUALITY is set to zero if the CEO is the chairperson of the board or the member of nominating, 
compensation, audit committee, and the value is set to one otherwise.  To reflect the negative 
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expectation between board size and corporate governance, we define variable BSIZE as the total 
number of board members. We determine Mpkg by the average value of whole compensation 
package (stock awards, restricted stock grants, option grants, and bonus) for top five executives 
of a firm divided by total compensation to measure managerial incentives. The more managerial 
incentives designed in CEOs’ compensation, the better the governance effects from aligning 
agency conflicts. INSOWN is defined as the fraction of outstanding shares owned by the largest 
institutional owners and BHOWN is measured by fraction of outstanding shares held by 
blockhoders who own more than 5 percent of outstanding shares. Both INSOWN and BHOWN 
are winsorized at 1% and 99%. We summarize the definitions of our governance variables in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Variable Definition and Predicted Sign 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Expected 
sign (H1) 
Expected 
sign (H2) 
Panel A. Governance Variables 
BSIZE 
Number of board 
members  
Total number of directors on a board 
+ - 
DUALITY 
The CEO is also the 
chairperson of the 
board 
Set to one if the CEO is the chairperson of the 
board; otherwise, set to zero ? ? 
PctOut 
Percentage of outside 
directors on a board 
Number of independent directors of a board 
divided by total number of directors on a board 
- + 
Mpkg 
Top managers’ 
incentive package 
The average value of equity compensation, 
included stock awards, restricted stock grants, 
and option grants for top 5 executives and the 
average value of bonus compensation for the 
top 5 executives divided by total compensation 
- + 
Insown 
Percentage of 
institutional 
shareholding 
Number of institutional holding shares divided 
by total number of shares outstanding - + 
Bhown 
Percentage of 
blockholders 
ownership 
Number of blockholders whose ownership is 
greater than 5% holding shares divided by total 
number of shares outstanding 
? ? 
GovIndex 
Governance Index 
based on good 
governance prediction 
in this paper 
1. Good governance prediction: 
Add 1 score to GovIndex if BSIZE < median 
(efficient board), PctOut > median 
(independent board), DUALITY=0, Mpkg > 
median (High managerial incentive), Insown > 
median (ownership monitor), and Bhown >  
median (ownership monitor) 
2. Range of GovIndex is from 0 to 6 
- + 
FN 
Governance factors 
based on Principal 
Component Analysis 
N is the number of factors extracted from 
Principal Component Analysis See Table 2 See Table 2 
Panel B. Control Variables for H2 
Ini_Dev 
Initial Deviation The absolute value of deviation from target 
leverage 
NA + 
Dividend 
Dividend payer 
indicator 
Set to 1 if dividend is paid in the fiscal year; 
otherwise, set to zero 
NA - 
FSize Firm size The logarithm of total assets NA + 
CF 
Cash-Flow measure A firm’s operating cash flow is defined as 
                       
       
      , where OIBDP 
is operating income before depreciation, TXT 
is the total taxes allocated on the income 
statement, XINT is the interest paid, and 
CAPX is the mean value of capital expenditure 
in year t deflated by lagged total assets (AT) 
for all Compustat firms in firm i’s 2-digit SIC 
industry code. CAPX is winsorized at 99% and 
CF at 1% and 99% 
NA + 
17 
 
In Table 1 Panel A, we also present the expected sign of each governance variable for both 
hypotheses. Good corporate governance may save the adjustment costs to the target leverage. An 
effective board (with higher board independence, a fit leadership structure7, or smaller size), an 
incentive compensation plan for management, and ownership monitor indicate strong 
governance mechanisms. We expect that a firm with a good governance system will a) have a 
negative relation with the initial deviation from the target and, b) employ a higher SOA than its 
weaker counterpart.  
2. Governance index created from relevant governance mechanisms 
Recently, Gompers et al. (2003) develop a “Governance Index” (GIndex) as a proxy of 
shareholder rights to test the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs and the 
relation with the value of firm. This synthetic index is a multiple governance mechanism 
comprising a number of provisions that restrict shareholder rights. If the value of GIndex is 
higher, the shareholder rights are more restricted and in turn the managerial power increases.  
They find that firms with severe agency costs are likely to be inversely related to the strength of 
shareholder rights. Stronger shareholder rights bring higher value of the firm, higher profits, 
higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and making fewer corporate acquisitions.  
Gompers et al. (2003)’s GIndex is widely used in corporate governance studies. For 
example, Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) examine the relation between the cost of debt 
financing and corporate governance. They follow the Gompers et al. (2003)’s governance index 
to measure the level of corporate governance of the firm and find a negative relation between the 
governance index and the cost of debt financing. However, the GIndex is composed by mixed 
aspects of antitakeover provisions; it may be hard to represent whole facets of corporate 
                                                 
7  A fit leadership structure of a board could be duality or non-duality. As we discussed in Appendix 1, two 
conflicting theories of duality is proposed in literature and research evidence in duality is mixed. 
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governance to affect firms’ capital structure in our study. Thus, we construct a new governance 
index (GovIndex) which comprises all dimensions in the influence of corporate finance decisions. 
We create GovIndex based on the literature that identifies the governance proxies that affect 
a firm’s performance more favorably. A small board, an independent board, an effective 
incentive-based compensation plan, high institutional ownership, and presence of large block-
holders are considered in literature to be desirable attributes of a good governance system.  On 
the other hand, many consider duality (when the CEO of the company also serves as the 
Chairman of the board) a negative attribute because of potential conflicts of interests when these 
two positions are held by the same person. Thus, an additional score is added into the governance 
index if a good governance mechanism is recognized. We form to the GovIndex by assigning 
one point to each of the following situations. Based on the index, the poorest corporate 
governance is represented by 0 and the best is represented by a score of 6.  
i) BSIZE (board efficiency): Size of the board is less than the median board size  
of the sample; 
ii) PctOut (Board independence): The extent the percentage of outsiders on the 
firm’s board is minus the median percentage of outsider represented in the 
sample ; 
iii) DUALITY (Conflict of Interest): CEO is not the Chairman ; 
iv) Mpkg (managerial incentive): incentive is greater than the median value of 
whole sample;  
v) Insown (better monitoring): Institutional ownership percentage is higher than the 
median value of whole sample; and  
19 
 
vi) Bhown (better monitoring): % of shares of held by blockholders is higher than 
the median value of sample. 
3. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
To improve above imperfections in previous corporate governance study, LRT (2007) and 
Dey (2008) employ principal components analysis (PCA) to measure various dimensions of a 
firm’s governance structure. PCA can extract the commonality of variables which are highly 
correlated to avoid the potential problems of multi-collinearity and endogenaity in statistics. The 
central concept of PCA is representation or summarization. It seems reasonable to apply PCA to 
this study because it can successfully reduce number of variables into a much smaller number of 
factors without omitting any dimension measured in corporate governance8.  
However, this methodology has been criticized in overlooking conceptual basis and difficult 
to provide economic interpretation. Researchers usually select relevant governance attributes in 
their empirical analyses in an ad hoc basis, i.e. the variables are most likely from past studies as 
well as some common knowledge. For that reason, previous researchers cannot find consistent 
number of characteristics to proxy multi-dimensional nature of corporate governance. The 
governance factors in their study always ignore some features of mechanism and cannot 
represent the entire aspect of corporate governance system. For instance, LRT (2007) use 39 
individual governance indicators (from board characteristics, anti-takeover provisions, 
compensation characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, and capital structure 
characteristics) to extract 14 factors by principal component analysis (PCA)9. One can observe 
that all of the factors in LRT’s work can be comprised in the board definition of “internal 
                                                 
8 Richard B. Darlington, professor of Cornell University, mentions that PCA is a statistical technique which can 
provide exact solutions for well-defined statistical problems and some practical problems. 
9 Based on the results of component loadings, their 14 factors are Active, Block, Affiliated, Insider appointed, 
Compensation Mix, Meetings, Lead Director, Anti-Takeover I, Old Directors, Debt, Insider Power, Board size, 
Anti-Takeover II, and Busy directors. 
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governance”.  Similarly, Dey (2008) obtains seven factors to represent different dimensions of 
governance from 22 individual variables related to the board of directors, executive 
compensation, director ownership, and auditor areas. The seven factors are Board I, Board II, 
Executive Compensations, Director Compensations, Auditor, Audit Committee, and Financial 
Reporting Quality. Once more, those factors fall into a small part of the internal and external 
governance. Besides, the accounting and auditing functions in external governance are 
overemphasized. 
While the use of PCA in determining governance factors is criticized in closing the eyes to a 
conceptual outline in sustaining multi-dimension governance characteristics, this methodology is 
considered still feasible as long as the research design of a study is based on a complete 
theoretical structure. To overcome this drawback, we figure out a systematic categorization to 
satisfy the purpose of this study discussed in Section II and Appendix 1. We propose three 
groups of governance indicators that may affect the distance of deviation from the target and the 
SOA to the target: board of directors, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. 
Hence, the governance factors extracted from PCA not only can characterize corporate 
governance faithfully but also present the synergy effect of all related governance indicators.  
The major procedure of PCA is to decide the number of extract factors. The eigenvalue 
method (the Kaiser’s rule), the most widely used criterion, is to retain only factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 (Kaiser, 1960)10 . This paper uses this criterion to determine the 
number of factors to retain. This procedure will keep the main components to capture most of the 
variance of the original data and avoid the multi-collinearity problem among factors. The PCA 
result is showed in Table 2.  
                                                 
10  An alternative graphical method called the screen test was first proposed by Cattell (1966). However, this 
technique is criticized in retaining too few factors. 
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Table 2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PCA process extracts two factors from our six governance measures. The first group 
includes Insown, Bhown, and PctOut. All three components present the monitoring function of 
corporate governance. Thus, factor one (F1) represents the monitor effect of corporate 
governance. Higher percentage of institutional ownership, blockholder, and outside directors 
represent better governance quality in a company. On the other hand, the second factor (F2) 
contains BSize, DUALITY, and Mpkg. We regard this factor as governance synergy effect. The 
signs of F2 are not predictable in both hypotheses because the components of F2 include two 
governance mechanisms representing weak governance and one for strong governance. One 
possible explanation for F2: Since incentive managerial compensation can stimulate CEO to 
make consistent decisions with shareholders (i.e. the agency conflicts decreased), the CEO 
serving in dual positions on the board becomes an efficient leadership structure, even if the board 
size is large.  
This table reports the factor loadings on each of the individual corporate governance 
variables and the expected sings for two hypotheses. Factors are computed using 
principal component analysis with retaining all factors with an eigenvalue rounded to 1. 
For each factor, individual variables with absolute value of the loadings exceeding 0.5 
are reported. 
Principal Factor Significant 
Components 
Factor 
Loadings 
Score Expected 
Sign: H1 
Expected 
Sign: H2 
F1: Monitor effect InsOwn 0.8594 0.5205 
- +  BHOwn  0.7678 0.4651 
 PctOut 0.5294 0.3206 
F2: Governance synergy     
effect 
 
BSize 0.5788 0.4687 
? ? DUALITY 0.5077 0.4111 
Mpkg 0.5900 0.4777 
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III.3 Data and other variable definition 
Our initial study sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from the 
Compustat – “Fundamentals Annual” database for the 1996 to 2008 period. We obtain stock-
market-related data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The data exclude 
firm years with missing data for total assets, assets lower than $10 million in 2000 U.S. dollars, 
or missing information in both Compustat and CRSP for computing the year-end market equity. 
The initial CEO compensation data comes from Compustat - “ExecuComp”, the board of 
director data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Governance database, 
and shareholder concentration data from the Thomson Reuters Ownership Database, the 
institutional holding (13f) data. 
We use the absolute value of stock return (|Return|) as a control variable in hypothesis one. 
In hypothesis two, we control for initial deviation, dividend, cash-flow realization, and firm size 
in the SOA model. Initial deviation (Ini_Dev) is the absolute value of deviation from the target 
leverage. We set a dividend payer indicator (Dividend) equal to one if dividend is paid in the 
fiscal year; otherwise, set to zero. Firm size (FSize) is measured by the logarithm value of total 
assets. We follow FFHS (2011)’s paper to define cash-flow realization (CF) as 
    
                       
       
      ,                                                                                   (7) 
where OIBDP is operating income before depreciation, TXT is the total taxes allocated on 
the income statement, XINT is the interest paid, and CAPX is the mean value of capital 
expenditure in year t deflated by lagged total assets (AT) for all Compustat firms in firm i’s 2-
digit SIC industry code. CAPX is winsorized at 99% and CF at 1% and 99%. We summarize the 
definitions of our control variables in Table 1 Panel B. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of leverage measures, governance variables, and other 
control variables. In Panel A, the mean value of market debt-to-capital ratio is 0.1895, the mean 
value of our target leverage is 0.2019, and the average value of deviation from target leverage is 
0.025. In Panel B, the average board size in our sample is 26. A board usually has 91.67 percent 
This table presents descriptive statistics for leverage measures, governance variables, 
and control variables. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. Target leverage ratio 
predicted by firm characteristics and industry median in the previous year. The 
prediction model is  
ititiit XLev   1
*  where X is a vector of firm characteristics (include total assets 
in year 2000 dollars, adjusted using the GDP deflator, firm age, market-to-book ratio, 
profitability measured as operating income before depreciation and amortization divided 
by assets, asset tangibility as fixed assets divided by total assets, cash flow volatility 
measured as the standard deviation of profitability, and whether the firm pays dividends 
in the fiscal year). The model is estimated in a year-by-year manner to avoid the look-
ahead bias. Deviation from target leverage is defined as 1
*
 ititit LevLevDev . 
Governance variables and control variables are as defined in Table 1.  
Variable N MIN MAX MEAN STD 
Panel A. Leverage, Target Leverage, and Deviation from Target Leverage 
Market debt-to-capital ratio 10633 0 0.9742 0.1895 0.1850 
Target marktet debt-to-capital ratio 10583 0 0.7806 0.2019 0.1269 
Deviation from Target Leverage 10583 -0.6830 0.5672 0.0250 0.1395 
Panel B. Governance variable 
Board size 10699 3 26 8.9329 2.3074 
Percentage of outside director 10699 0 0.9167 0.6706 0.1726 
Duality 10699 0 1 0.5954 0.4908 
Institutional ownership 10699 0.1014 1 0.7525 0.1760 
Blockholder ownership 10699 0.0500 0.6749 0.2185 0.1251 
Manager compensation package 10699 0 0.9774 0.5582 0.2139 
Governance Index 10583 0 6 2.9035 1.3524 
Panel C. Control Variable 
Stock return 10699 -0.9723 10.2000 0.0398 0.5076 
Initial deviation 10615 0 0.6830 0.1080 0.0915 
Dividend payer indicator 10637 0 1 0.5191 0.4997 
Cash-Flow measure 10637 -1.2184 0.4737 0.0391 0.0973 
Ln(Total Asset) 10637 3.2741 12.5867 7.2632 1.3700 
Total Assets 10637 26.42 292654 4255.41 11917.47 
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of outside directors.  Around 59.54 percent of US companies in our sample present duality 
leadership structure in the board. This number confirms a survey result that between 60 and 80 
percent of all major corporations from 1999 to 2005 has the same person act as both the CEO 
and chairman of the board. The mean value of institutional ownership is around 3 times larger 
than blockholder ownership. The average stimulated compensation package counts total 
compensation approximated 55.82 percent. Our measure of overall governance system in 
governance index has a mean value around 3 out of the range from 0 to 6. Thus, our sample 
companies are generally under fair governance status. In Panel C of Table 3, the mean value of 
total assets is 4,255.41 (million dollars), indicating that the firm size in our sample in general is 
large and those are firms with corporate governance variables available.  
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IV. Results 
IV.1 Initial deviation and corporate governance in whole sample 
We estimate equation (5) by three models: (1) multiple governance indicators in one 
regression including BSize, DUALITY, PctOut, Mpkg, Insown and Bhown (Model 1), (2) a 
governance index created by relevant dimensions of governance in affecting capital structure 
(Model 2), and (3) governance factors extracted from PCA analysis (Model 3). We use |Return| 
as control variable in this model since change of leverage level might be due to stock price 
change (Welch, 2004)11. Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables in 
hypothesis one. The correlation between variables is generally low, with the exception of the 
correlation between Insown and Bhown: 0.4848. To reduce the potential multi-collinearity 
problem, we employ two different versions of Model 1: Model 1-1 that excludes Bhown and 
Model 1-2 that excludes Insown. 
  
                                                 
11 Welch (2004) mentions that “stock return can explain about 40 percent of debt ratio dynamics…”. 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
 
Ini_dev BSIZE PctOut DUALITY Mpkg Insown Bhown |Return| GovIndex F1 F2 
Ini_dev 1 
      
 
    
BSIZE 
0.0466 
1 
     
 
   [<.0001]  
PctOut 
-0.0264 0.0764 
1 
    
 
   [0.0066] [<.0001]  
DUALITY 
0.0103 0.0478 0.0883 
1 
   
 
   [0.2894] [<.0001] [<.0001]  
Mpkg 
-0.0760 0.0745 0.0437 0.0758 
1 
  
 
   [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]  
Insown 
-0.0762 -0.0775 0.3161 -0.0066 0.1083 
1 
 
 
   [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.4994] [<.0001]  
Bhown 
0.0300 -0.1423 0.1124 -0.0330 -0.1006 0.4848 
1 
 
   [0.0020] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0004] [<.0001] [<.0001]  
|Return| 
0.1175 -0.1017 -0.0223 -0.0289 0.0489 -0.0432 -0.0366 
1 
   [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0219] [0.0029] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0002] 
GovIndex 
-0.0688 -0.3423 0.3774 -0.3280 0.2788 0.6118 0.5010 0.0290 
1   
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0028] 
  
F1 
-0.0416 -0.2023 0.5295 0.0157 0.0390 0.8593 0.7681 -0.0333 0.7175 
1 
 [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.1069] [0.0001] [<.0001] [0.0006] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
F2 
-0.0317 0.5803 0.4517 0.5090 0.5893 0.0788 -0.2903 -0.0386 -0.1027 -0.0013 
1 
[0.0011] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.8978] 
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Table 5 presents the estimates of equation (5) that examines the relation between initial 
deviation and three corporate governance measures. The coefficient estimations in Model 1 show 
that most of our governance indicators including BSize, DUALITY, PctOut, Mpkg, and Insown 
are significant with expected signs. Specifically, the results indicate that the firms with large 
board size, CEO duality, a low percentage of outside directors in the board, low managerial 
incentives, and a low percentage of institutional ownership have large starting deviation from the 
target. However, the relation between Bhown and initial deviation is significantly positive, 
inconsistent with our expectations. We cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for this result.  
However, some empirical evidence shows that the over-concentrated ownerships may behave on 
their interests in the expense of other shareholders. For example, Zhong, Gribbin, and Zheng 
(2007) find evidence that blockholders pose a threat in intervening corporate operation due to the 
requirement of higher return from their investment than other shareholders. Konijn, Kräussl, and 
Lucas (2011) find a negative correlation between blockholder and firm values measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Thus, the effect of blockholders on capital structure is an open question.  
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Table 5. Initial Deviation and Corporate Governance 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (5) for hypothesis one: 
ititjiit GovDev  ||  where |Devit| denotes the initial deviation from the target leverage of 
firm i at time t, Govit are corporate governance variables measured in three forms: (1) individual 
proxies for governance quality including board size, duality, percentage of outside directors, 
managerial compensation package, percentage of institutional ownership and blockholder 
ownership (Model 1-1, 1-2), (2) a governance index created by multiple dimensions of 
governance (Model 2), and (3) governance factors extracted from principle component analysis 
(Model 3). Initial deviation and governance variables are as defined in Table 1. P-values are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively for the regression specification. 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
N=10583 
Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model 2 Model 3 
|Return| + 
 0.0301*** 
[<.0001] 
 0.0313*** 
[<.0001] 
 0.0287*** 
[<.0001] 
 0.0276*** 
[<.0001] 
BSIZE + 
 0.0024*** 
[<.0001] 
 0.0029*** 
[<.0001]   
DUALITY + 0.0033* 
[0.0677] 
0.0039** 
[0.0291]   
PctOut - 
-0.0049 
[0.3696] 
-0.0170*** 
[0.0011]   
Mpkg - -0.0350*** 
[<.0001] 
-0.0360*** 
[<.0001]   
Insown - 
-0.0282*** 
[<.0001]    
Bhown - 
 
0.0300*** 
[<.0001]   
GovIndex -     
-0.0049*** 
[<.0001] 
  
F1 - 
   
-0.0035*** 
[<.0001] 
F2 ? 
   
-0.0025*** 
[0.0047] 
Adj R2 
 
0.0278 0.0269 0.0188 0.0157 
 
 
In Model 2, we examine the relation between initial deviation and a governance index that 
comprises of multiple dimensions of governance potentially affecting the capital structure 
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decisions of firms. Note that higher governance index indicates better quality of corporate 
governance. The coefficient of the governance index is significantly negative, consistent with our 
hypothesis that firms with stronger governance stay closer to the target. Finally, the results in 
Model 3 show that two governance factors—monitor and synergy—extracted by the principal 
component analysis are significantly negatively related to the deviation from the target. . In other 
words, the better the governance monitor function and synergy of the firm, the lower the distance 
of its capital structure from its target. In sum, the evidence based on all three measures of 
corporate governance indicates that the quality of corporate governance of a firm affects how far 
its current leverage is from its target. 
IV.1.1. Further test of the relation between initial deviation and the quality of corporate 
governance 
We perform another test to examine the validity of the findings above. This test is based 
primarily on the premise that a firm with a good governance system might decide to deliberately 
stay deviated from the target. This is especially true for an underleveraged firm as it receives 
additional benefits stemming from the reserve borrowing capacity. In other words, a clear 
possibility exists that even a firm with good governance might decide not to take corrective 
action for certain deviations on either side of the target. However, a good-governance firm is 
expected to take serious actions to prevent the firm from being extremely deviated from the 
target. Thus, we hypothesize that   extremely underleveraged firms and extremely overleveraged 
firms are likely to be dominated by firms with weak governance.  
We test this hypothesis in this section. In so doing, we measure governance quality based 
on the governance index discussed above. We define stronger governance when GovIndex score 
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is 5 or above and weaker governance when the score is 1 or below. We expect to observe a 
decrease (increase) in the number of firms with strong (weak) governance status in the two 
extreme cases. We define severely underleveraged and severely overleveraged when a) standard 
deviation is greater than -/+1, and when b) it is greater than -/+1.5. Then, we compare the 
percentage representation of the stronger versus weaker firms in the two severe groups. The two-
sample T-test is employed to test the significance of the difference. 
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Table 6. Governance Status verses Leverage Level in Percentage and Difference 
This table presents and compares governance status in different leverage level. We measure 
governance status based on the governance index created in this study (GovIndex). Strong 
governance status is defined as GovIndex equal to 5 and 6 and weak governance status is defined 
as GovIndex equal to 0 and 1. We look at two extreme cases that under-leverage or over-
leverage beyond 1 standard deviation from the target and 1.5 times standard deviation from the 
target.  
First part of table shows whole sample with different governance status. Second and third parts 
of table show extreme subsamples where beyond 1 standard deviation and 1.5 times standard 
deviation respectively. The difference with whole sample in different target deviation level is 
conducted by two-sample T-test. We also test whether governance status is associated with the 
level of leverage deviation from target by chi-square test of independence. Null hypothesis: 
governance status and target leverage deviation are independent. P-values are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Leverage Level 
Whole Sample Strong Gov Weak Gov 
Difference 
N N % N % 
Whole Sample 10583 1326 12.53% 1710 16.16% 3.63% 
Beyond 1 σ 
underleverage 
1392 140 10.06% 248 17.82%   
Difference with whole 
sample   
-2.47%*** 
[0.0082]  
1.66% 
[0.1158] 
4.13% 
Beyond 1 σ overleverage 1496 154 10.29% 250 16.71%  
Difference with whole 
sample   
-2.24%** 
[0.0136]  
0.55% 
[0.5870] 
2.79% 
χ 2 test of independence 
 
        
21.94*** 
[0.0002] 
Beyond 1.5 σ 
underleverage 
481 46 9.56% 95 19.75% 
 
Difference with whole 
sample   
-2.97%* 
[0.0536]  
3.6%** 
[0.0370] 
6.56% 
Beyond 1.5 σ 
overleverage 
808 79 9.78% 131 16.21% 
 
Difference with whole 
sample   
-2.75%** 
[0.0218]  
0.05% 
[0.9674] 
2.81% 
χ 2 test of independence   
  
        
14.36*** 
[0.0062] 
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Table 6 presents the comparison of governance status in different leverage levels. The first 
part of Table 6 shows the number of observations in the full sample for the two governance 
groups.  For the full sample, 12.53% and 16.67% are characterized as stronger and weaker 
governance respectively. We find that the representation of the stronger governance in the two 
severe categories is significantly smaller than their proportion in the whole sample, while for the 
weaker governance it is higher (significant when the standard deviation is above 1.5). Both 
findings are consistent with the expectation that firms with poor governance are more likely to be 
associated with extreme leverages. 
In addition, we test whether governance status is associated with the level of leverage 
deviation from target by chi-square test of independence in Table 6. Both in the 1 standard 
deviation and 1.5 times standard deviation subsamples, we reject the null hypothesis of chi-
square test that governance status and target leverage deviation are independent. Thus, the 
evidence confirms that corporate governance quality is associated with deviations.  
IV.2. Speed of adjustment and corporate governance in whole sample 
To examine how the quality of corporate governance affects a firm’s speed of adjustment 
(SOA) toward the target, we estimate regression (6) using three same measures of corporate 
governance as employed earlier. We control for four factors that might potential affect a firm’s 
SOA. The four factors are the extent of deviation from the target, firm size, dividend payment, 
and cash-flow realization. Mukherjee and Wang (2012) find a positive relation between the 
extent of deviation and a firm’s SOA. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) suggest that larger firms are 
able to access capital markets at a lower floatation cost. The lower cost makes it easier for larger 
firms to employ a higher speed of adjustment to their targets. Fama and French (2002) find 
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evidence that dividend-paying-firms have slower SOAs. FFHS (2011) propose that cash-flow 
realizations can adjust leverage at a lower marginal cost, allowing firms to move faster toward 
their targets.  
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Table 7. Regression Result for Hypothesis Two 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (6): 
itititkititjititit DevGovcsoaDevControlbsoaaDevsoaLevLev 
~)(.)(..1    where Devit 
denotes the deviation from target leverage of firm i at time t, Controlit are j control variables 
including initial deviation, firm size, dividend, and absolute value of cash flows, Govit are k 
corporate governance variables measured in three forms: (1) individual proxies for governance 
quality including board size, duality, percentage of outside directors, managerial compensation 
package, percentage of institutional ownership and blockholder ownership (Model 1-1, 1-2), (2) 
a governance index created by multiple dimensions of governance (Model 2), and (3) governance 
factors extracted from principle component analysis (Model 3). Initial deviation and governance 
variables are as defined in Table 1. P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicates the 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively for the 
regression specification. 
 
Variable 
  N=10583 
Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model 2 Model 3 
Soa.a + 
0.0125 
[0.7869] 
 0.0462 
[0.3012] 
0.1026*** 
[0.0076] 
0.2122*** 
[<.0001] 
Soa.b 
(Ini_Dev) 
+ 
0.1502*** 
[0.0060] 
0.1461*** 
[0.0071] 
0.0994* 
[0.0611] 
0.1533*** 
[0.0045] 
Soa.b (FSize) + 
-0.0028 
[0.6209] 
-0.0024 
[0.6767] 
0.0082* 
[0.0765] 
-0.0066 
[0.2309] 
Soa.b 
(Dividend) 
- 
-0.0427*** 
[0.0018] 
-0.0461*** 
[0.0007] 
-0.0436*** 
[0.0012] 
-0.0468*** 
[0.0005] 
Soa.b (|CF|) + 
-0.0006 
[0.9957] 
-0.0151 
[0.8868] 
0.0256 
[0.8065] 
-0.0038 
[0.9713] 
Soa.c (BSIZE) - 
0.0013 
[0.7000] 
0.0006 
[0.8507] 
  
Soa.c 
(DUALITY) 
- 
0.0410*** 
[0.0017] 
0.0396*** 
[0.0024] 
  
Soa.c (PctOut) + 
0.0905** 
[0.0174] 
0.1119*** 
[0.0021] 
  
Soa.c (Mpkg) + 
0.0809** 
[0.0126] 
0.0813** 
[0.0122] 
  
Soa.c (Insown) + 
0.0389 
[0.3075] 
   
Soa.c (Bhown) + 
  -0.0561 
[0.2309] 
    
Soa.c 
(GovIndex) 
+ 
     0.0026 
[0.5768] 
  
Soa.c (F1) + 
   0.0096 
[0.1123] 
Soa.c (F2) ? 
   0.0356*** 
[<.0001] 
Adj R2 
 
0.0701 0.0701 0.0681 0.0702 
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The regression results of whole sample for the sample period of 1996 to 2008 in three 
governance SOA models are reported in Table 7. The number of firm-year observations is 
10,583. We are most interested in soa.c, the coefficient associated with DEV*GOV, the 
interaction of governance and deviations.  In Model 1, regression results indicate that three out of 
the six individual governance proxies are significantly positively related to leverage changes: 
namely the soa.c of DUALITY is around 0.04, that of PctOut (outside board members) is around 
0.10, and that of Mpkg (managerial compensation) is approximately 0.08. In other words, duality, 
outside board members and greater managerial incentive tend to increase the speed of adjustment 
toward the optimal capital structure, and the latter two are consistent with our expectations. The 
combined coefficient of these factors is 0.22, implying a non-trivial impact on the speed of 
adjustment. For instance, if a firm’s corporate governance status is 10 percent higher than 
another, its SOA is faster by about 2.2 percent. 
Model 2 shows that the coefficient of GovIndex is positive but not statistically significant. 
In Model 3, we test how the two main components -- governance monitoring effect and 
governance synergy effect -- affect the SOAs. The results indicate that the monitor component is 
not a significant factor while the governance synergy is. Recall that the synergy component 
primarily reflects compensation, board size, and duality, and therefore Model 3 results are 
partially consistent with Model 1 that also indicates compensation and duality being important. 
Generally, overall results are consistent with our expectations. 
It is important to note that, in addition to the above-mentioned governance proxies, three out 
of four control variables show significant influence on SOAs as well (Table 7). Consistent with 
Mukherjee and Wang’s (2012) paper that the extent of deviation from the target determines a 
firm’s SOA, the range of soa.b in initial deviation is from 0.09 to 0.15. That is, if a firm’s 
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starting distance to the target is 10 percent larger than another, its SOA is faster by 1.2 percent on 
average. The size of the firm (FSize) also slightly increases SOAs in Model 2. Additionally, we 
find evidence consistent with Fama and French (2002) that dividend payment decreases SOAs. 
However, cash-flow realization is not a significant factor in three models. 
In brief, our empirical results verify that firms adjust their capital structure to the target with 
different speed and further prove that corporate governance plays an important role in 
determining the SOA.  Specifically, a firm with duality structure, relatively independent board, 
and an effective compensation package (to align CEO’s interest to shareholders’) has a faster 
SOA. 
IV.2.1. Further test of the relation between SOA and the quality of corporate governance 
In Subsection IV.1.1., above we posited that even a good governance firm might decide not 
to rebalance if the deviation does not exceed certain range on either side of the target. We apply 
a similar premise in this subsection and argue that even a good-governance firm may decide to 
apply a slow SOA up to certain deviation. However, when the deviations are extreme, this firm is 
expected to adopt a significantly higher speed than its weaker counterpart. We test this 
hypothesis in this subsection by equation (2). We are interested in λ, the speed of adjustment of 
firm i in time t. We define stronger governance when a firm’s GovIndex score is 5 or above and 
weaker governance when the score is 1 or below. A firm is considered severely underleveraged 
(overleveraged) when its leverage is more than -1.5 (+1.5) standard deviations away from the 
target.  The empirical results are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Speed of Adjustment in Governance Status 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (2): 
ititititit LevLevLevLev 
~)( 1
*
1    where Levit is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of year 
t, *itLev  is the target leverage estimated from equation (3) and λ is the speed of adjustment. 
Strong governance status is defined as GovIndex equal to 5 and 6 and weak governance status is 
defined as GovIndex equal to 0 and 1. A firm is considered severely underleveraged 
(overleveraged) when its leverage is more than -1.5 (+1.5) standard deviations away from the 
target. P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively for the regression specification. 
 
Panel A. Extremely Underleveraged Subsample 
 
Strong Gov Weak Gov 
   
λ (SOA) 
0.4564** 
[0.0385] 
 
0.2594 
[0.1158] 
 
  N 46 95 
Adj R2 0.0732 0.0159 
 
  Panel B. Extremely Overleveraged Subsample 
 
Strong Gov Weak Gov 
   
λ (SOA) 
0.3788** 
[0.0135] 
 
-0.0967 
[0.3524] 
   
N 79 131 
Adj R2 0.0646 -0.001 
  
  
   
 
 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the SOAs employed by the stronger and weaker governance 
systems for the extremely underleveraged group. The SOA for extremely underleveraged firms 
with strong governance is 0.46. The SOA of the weaker governance group is not significantly 
different from zero.  Panel B of Table 8 presents SOAs employed by the two governance groups 
for the extremely overleveraged group. The SOA for extremely overleveraged firms with strong 
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governance is 0.38 12  compared to the SOA of the weaker group which once again is not 
significantly different from zero. Both of these findings provide additional support for our 
second hypothesis.  
 
  
                                                 
12 The half life of leverage deviation is 1.12 years for extremely underleveraged firms with strong governance. The 
half life of leverage deviation is 1.45 years for extremely overleveraged firms with strong governance, which is 0.33 
year longer than extremely underleveraged firms with strong governance. 
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V. Summary and Conclusion 
A good corporate governance system promotes the alignments of interests between 
managers and owners of a firm. To attain this goal, a good system is expected to minimize 
avoidable costs. We posit that costs facing a firm related to deviations from its target capital 
structure are a function of the extent of deviations.  Based on this premise, we hypothesize that a 
firm with strong a governance system in place will maintain a shorter deviation and employ a 
higher speed of adjustment than its counterpart with weak governance. Specifically, we argue 
that the absolute deviation from the target will have a negative relation and the speed of 
adjustment to the target has a positive relation with the quality of corporate governance.  
We find that the stronger the governance structures in a company the shorter is its deviation 
from the target. In further confirmation of this finding, we find that the two extreme leverage 
deviation subsamples are dominated by firms with weak governance. Our results regarding the 
speed of adjustments are largely consistent with our hypothesis.  Again, in further support of the 
second hypothesis, we show that the speed employed by firms with stronger governance is 
substantially higher in both extremely under- and overleveraged situations than their weaker 
peers, the SOA of which is not significantly different from zero. 
In conclusion, this study extends the partial adjustment literature by incorporating the effect 
of corporate governance. This paper also contributes to literature by measuring corporate 
governance in three different ways to possibly capture the influence of corporate governance on 
capital structure.  
A caveat on the paper is in order. The estimation method (OLS) used to measure the speed 
of adjustment might be considered too basic. For future study, a sophisticated estimation on the 
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speed of adjustment might provide further insight into the relation between capital structure and 
corporate governance.  
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APPENDIX 1.  Relevant Governance Indicators in the Rebalance Process 
Traditional corporate governance indicators are characteristics of board and ownership 
structure since they serve as direct monitor power from shareholders. Based on agency theory, 
those functions help to reconcile management’s interests with shareholders and further increase 
firm performance. For our research purpose, the relevant governance mechanism should focus on 
the monitoring function to enclose related decision makers and to perceive the integrated effect 
of the whole system. Further, the relevant governance instruments can reduce the adjustment 
costs in rebalancing to the firm’s optimal capital structure. Thus, we identify related governance 
mechanisms into three groups: the board (size, independence, and leadership structure), the 
managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. 
1. The board 
A firm’s board has two major responsibilities: to monitor managerial behavior and to give 
officially approve of material corporate decisions and strategies. Board efficiency may be 
presented on its independence, leadership structure, and size. Board independence may blow the 
value of firms. The more independent a board is, the higher monitoring function the board 
present, and further prevent managerial opportunism to decrease firm value. Empirical evidence 
shows that companies have better performance if their boards include more outsiders (Baysinger 
and Butler, 1985). Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley, Coles, and Terry 
(1994) find that boards dominated by outsiders are more likely to behave in shareholders’ 
interest. 
Another issue of board independence is CEO duality, the board leadership structure. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) and Yermack (1996) assert that the agency problem will be more serious 
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when a firm’s CEO serves as the chairman of the board at the same time. Some other research 
also point out that CEOs serve as a member of the nominating committee, the compensation 
committee, and/or the audit committee, they may have too much power to decide their own perk 
and harm the independence of the board. As a result, separation between two individuals is a way 
to control agency problems. Nevertheless, Donaldson and Davis (1991) propose stewardship 
theory against the hypothesis of agency theory that executive managers are willing to be a good 
steward of the corporate assets rather than being an opportunistic shirker. This theory implies 
that CEOs and directors often have the same interests as shareholders. Thus, under stewardship 
theory, duality can assist executive managers to put into practice their plans completely and to 
increase the efficiency of decision making in the board. Since these two conflicts theory, 
empirical evidence is mixed. Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) document no significant difference 
in the long-term performance for duality and non-duality structure firms. Some empirical 
evidence supports stewardship idea and shows that CEO duality may benefit some firms while 
split positions do for other firms. Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) and Elsayed, K (2007) find 
that duality improves corporate performance when the performance of the firm is low. Brickley, 
Coles and Jarrell (1996) considerate the potential costs and benefits of split CEO-Chair positions 
and provide evidence of a performance advantage in the separation for large firms.  
On the other hands, board size is widely discussed in literature which determines the 
effectiveness of monitor (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 
2007). Specifically, board size reflects a tradeoff between the firm’s specific benefits in 
increasing monitoring and the costs of such monitoring. Although in some specific circumstance 
larger boards provide optimal monitoring than smaller ones, most of the governance literature 
generally suggests that smaller boards may have less divergence opinion among board members. 
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Also, discussion in smaller boards is more efficient in carrying out board functions than in larger 
boards. Typically, empirical evidence generally shows inverse relation between board size and 
firm value. As a result, governance mechanisms of board effectiveness enhance monitoring and 
provide a fair evaluation to executive managers. An effective board further reduces the costs of 
firms to adjust to their optimal capital structure.  
2. The managerial incentives 
Managerial incentives play a key role in aligning management’s interests to shareholders in 
solving agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that the owner-manager who has 
less than 100% equity has incentive to maximize his own benefits at the expense of outside 
shareholders. Specifically, no agency costs exist if the management has 100% of the residual 
claims of the firm; once their ownership below to 100%, the agency relationship between the 
manager and outsiders will bring additional monitoring costs and bonding costs of the firm. 
Besides, manager’s self-serving behavior might decrease the value of the firm. Hence, increasing 
managements’ equity ownership may be a feasible way to motive them working on shareholders’ 
interests. This idea is reflected in modern compensation design by granting equity incentives to 
managers. Hall and Liebrnan (1998) find a strong relationship between firm performance and 
CEO compensation driven almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock 
options. Core and Guay (1999) show that firms effectively use grants of equity incentives to 
reward past performance. For our analysis, the consistent opinions between management and 
shareholders stimulated by an incentive compensation plan could mitigate agency problems and 
reduce firms’ costs in making material financial decision. Thus, the adjustment cost toward 
optimal leverage is saved.  
3. Ownership concentration 
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In addition to board and compensation system, another relevant governance mechanism 
which may affect corporate financial decision is the ownership concentration of firms. We 
consider two variables, institutional ownership and blockholders. Institutional investors and other 
blockholders with large ownership stakes may influence all features of corporate strategy and 
have strong incentives to maximize their firms’ value.  Holding substantial ownership stakes 
makes them expose to higher risk than other divergent shareholders and motivate them to 
monitor management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990). Barclay, 
Holderness and Pontiff (1993) find that stock price reaction to large blockholder trades is 
positive. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) provide evidence that presence of blockholders leads to 
higher price to earnings ratios, especially for firms with low asset specificity and open 
information structures. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) evidence positive incentive 
effect related to the share of cash-flow rights held by large shareholders. In addition, institutional 
investors and other blockholders hold substantial voting power through their large ownership 
stakes, so they also have strong incentives to put pressure on managers or even to oust them 
through a proxy fight or a takeover. Thus, in debt rebalancing process, they play an indirect role 
to overcome conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers and further decrease the 
cost of adjustment to shorten the time of firms toward their target.  
However, if the ownership too concentrates on few people, the minority may behave on 
their interests in the expense of other shareholders. Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2006) test 
blockholder ownership effects on firm value and confirm the conflicts of interest between 
blockholders and minority investors. Zhong, Gribbin, and Zheng (2007) find evidence that 
blockholders pose a threat in intervening corporate operation due to the requirement of higher 
return from their investment than other shareholders. Konijn, Kräussl, and Lucas (2011) question 
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theoretical literature on whether a single large blockholder or a set of dispersed small 
blockholders is better for firm value. They find a negative correlation between blockholder and 
firm values measured by Tobin’s Q. Thus, the effect of blockholders on capital structure is an 
open question in literature. 
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CHAPTER 2: DO OPTION TRADERS ON REITs AND NON-REITs 
REACT DIFFERENTLY TO NEW INFORMATION? 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The real estate market can be volatile, but whether their price movements are stronger or 
weaker than justified by fundamentals is an open issue.13 This study attempts to compare the 
reactions to information in the option markets on real estate investment trusts (REITs) to those of 
other stocks. Two Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) on REITs are used as proxies for the real 
estate sector, since REITs represent the most liquid sector in the real estate market. It should be 
noted however that REITs operate in the commercial, not residential, real estate property market; 
that is, the study does not seek to draw implications for the 2008 crisis. 
To assess the degree of overreactions, the study utilizes a method based on Stein (1989). 
Stein’s method compares the relative movements of implied volatilities from long-term and 
short-term options to infer the degree of overreaction. The reasons for examining options rather 
than stocks are elaborated in Stein (1989). Most importantly, the volatility of the underlying asset 
is the only unobservable variable in option valuation. In contrast, stock values are complicated 
by additional uncertainties such as changes in risk premium. Stein states that “This ambiguity 
(changes in risk premium) does not arise in the context of options, where arbitrage 
considerations lead to prices that are independent of riskiness.” To infer the degree of 
overreaction, Stein makes use of the information contained in the term structure of options’ 
implied volatilities. Intuitively, if stock volatility has a tendency to return to their long-term 
                                                 
13 The figure in appendix A presents the performance comparison of Vanguard REIT ETF with S&P 500 
Index during the crisis period. The Vanguard REIT Index starts to perform poorer than S&P 500 Index 
since first quarter of 2007; it turns even worse than S&P 500 Index after the fourth quarter of 2008. The 
Vanguard REIT is more volatile than S&P during the period. 
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mean, long-term investors should revise their expectations for future volatility to a smaller extent 
than their short-term counterparts. His empirical results using S&P 100 index options show that 
the implied volatility for long-term options moves almost in lockstep with that of short-term 
options, thereby suggesting overreactions. In this study, we apply Stein’s (1989) method to 
analyze systematic differences in reactions between REITs and non-REITs index options. More 
specifically, we examine the changes in implied volatilities of options on the exchange traded 
funds (ETFs) of iShare Dow Jones US Real Estate Fund (IYR), Vanguard REIT Index (VNQ), 
and S&P 500 index (SPY). The former two are the proxies for the real estate market, whereas 
SPY is the proxy for non-REITs. These funds are frequently referred to in media coverage, and 
the option markets on IYR and SPY are fairly liquid.    
The question raised here is which market, REITs or non-REITs, reacts more strongly to 
new information? We feel that there are arguments on both sides. On the one hand, REITs’ 
property holdings are mostly tangible, so the valuation of REITs should be relatively less 
subjective, compared to other industries especially those where goodwill, patent, technology and 
other intangible assets represent a non-trivial portion of firm value. REITs are also subject to 
short-term trading restrictions on their properties, hence limiting their speculative activities. 
Additionally, several studies document a low degree of information asymmetry for the REIT 
industry.14 Finally, most REITs operate in the commercial real estate markets that involve high 
leverage, and most are probably closely monitored by creditors, capital markets, and investors. 
From these perspectives, REITs market should react less strongly to information, compared to 
non-REITs. On the other hand, real estate transactions tend to involve a great degree of leverage 
and real estate properties are hard to arbitrage, thus mispricing might persist over time. Moreover, 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998), Kallberg, Liu, and Srinivasan (2003), and 
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010). 
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a REIT is required to pay out around 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends to be qualified as a 
REIT, which forces REITs to rely on external financing to maintain growth and do so on a 
regular basis. Overall, arguments for a lower probability of excessive reactions for REITs appear 
to be stronger. Indeed, our empirical results indicate that REIT market is characterized by a 
lower degree of reaction relative to non-REITs, represented by SPY.  
A secondary purpose of the study is to compare the difference in the strength of reactions 
between up and down periods in the REIT market. It is hypothesized here the reactions should be 
stronger during the down market than during the up market. This argument primarily comes from 
the standpoint of leverage. While leverage amplifies returns in both up and down markets, the 
down markets are associated with a greater degree of leverage15 and foreclosures and other 
financial constraints can lead to stronger reactions.16 Our results support this view that down 
markets are associated with stronger reactions to information.  
Our paper differs from the studies on the term structure of implied volatilities in that we 
concentrate on the difference between implied volatilities on REITs and non-REITs, whereas 
previous studies estimate the degree of overreaction for one general market index.17 The papers 
by Diz and Finucane (1993), Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994), and He, Lee, and Wei (2010) 
demonstrate that the inferred degree of overreaction is sensitive to the statistical specification 
and the assumption for the volatility process. These issues arguably are less critical here, unless 
measurement problems are more severe for a particular type of fund.  
                                                 
15 In down markets, real estate equity value falls, thus implying a greater degree of leverage. 
16 Housing bubbles can have a substantial wealth effect, as shown by Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005). 
This wealth effect can also mean a greater degree of overreaction. 
17 One exception is He, Lee, and Wei (2010) that compare the degree of overreactions of growth stocks 
and value stocks. Their results indicate a greater degree of overreaction by growth stocks.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a brief 
background of the REIT industry. Section III reviews the related literature, concentrating on the 
more recent ones that were developed after Stein (1989). Section IV describes the data and 
presents the methodology. Section V presents the empirical results, and Section VI offers 
concluding remark. 
 
  
 54 
 
II. Background on REITs  
The Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry was facilitated by the Real Estate 
Investment Trust Act of 1960. A real estate company is granted a special tax status (no corporate 
income tax) if it derives the majority of its income from real estate related transactions and if it 
pays out the majority of its earnings as dividends. A REIT is traded like a stock in the stock 
market and over the years the liquidity of REIT stocks has become generally good. In general, 
the correlation between REITs and other stocks and bonds is low, making them a useful 
diversification tool. In particular, Ibbotson Associates conclude: (1) REITs offer an attractive 
risk/reward trade-off; (2) the correlation between REIT returns and other investments has 
declined over the last 30 years; and (3) REITs may boost return and/or reduce risk when added to 
a diversified portfolio. 
The growth of the REIT industry accelerated after the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which 
reduced the tax benefits of other forms of real estate firms. Institutional holding restrictions of 
REITs were eased in 1993, further facilitating the growth of the industry. The booming real 
estate markets before 2008 substantially increased the size of the industry. Then in 2007, a crisis 
in the subprime mortgage market became evident. In September 2008, the failure of Lehman 
Brothers further eroded investors’ confidence. It was therefore not surprising that the valuation 
of real estate related securities crashed. At the end of the real estate peak year 2006, there were a 
total of 183 REITs with a market capitalization totaling $438 billion. At the end of 2009, the 
market capitalization was roughly $271 billion; the number of REITs was 142. Of the 142 firms, 
115 firms are classified as equity REITs (REITs that invest in real estate properties), 23 firms are 
considered as mortgage REITs (REITs that invest in mortgage securities), and 4 firms are hybrid 
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REITs. Both the number of REITs and total market capitalization were substantially lower than 
those of 2006 peak.18   
 
  
                                                 
18 The numbers come from National Association of REITs. See appendix B. 
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III. Related Literature 
In theory, implied volatility inferred from option price is a forward-looking indicator of 
asset price volatility, but the empirical evidence on its predictive power of future volatility is 
somewhat mixed. For instance, Bates (1991) examines the prices of S&P 500 futures options 
prior to the crash of 1987 and finds evidence that a crash could be expected by option prices. 
Specifically, the result shows that out-of-the-money puts became abnormally expensive during 
the year before the crash and that general options pricing models with positively skewed 
distributions cannot predict the crash but a jump-diffusion model do; hence he suggests that a 
crash could be predicted by options prices. Other studies also suggest that implied volatility has 
substantial informational content and is superior to historical volatility to forecast future market 
volatility (Malz, 2001; Fung, 2007; Charoenwong, Jenwittayaroje, and Low, 2009). However, a 
few studies cannot find visible correlation between implied volatility and future volatility 
(Canina and Figlewski, 1993; Gemmill, 1996). Malz (2001) investigate 1992-1993 European 
monetary crisis and 1997 Asian crisis through surveying the behavior of implied volatility and 
volatility smile. He finds evidence that implied volatilities convey useful information for 
forecasting market stress. Lopes and Polson (2009) propose sequential particle filtering methods 
to study volatility dynamics during 2007-08 credit crisis in US. They find that tracking volatility 
in turbulent periods is hard and the pure stochastic volatility and GARCH (1, 1) models perform 
poorly in estimating market-stress period but the stochastic volatility jump model has some 
power in prediction. Fung (2007) examines how implied volatility conveys information at the 
time of the 1997 Hong Kong stock market crash and reveals that implied volatility is superior to 
other possible variables in predicting future realized volatility. On the other hand, Gemmill 
(1996) focus on the changing shape of the volatility smile and find that the skewness in U.K. was 
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unrelated to 1987 crash in the US. Bhabra, Gonzalez, Kim, and Powell (2001) find that option 
traders facing 1997 economic crisis in Korea respond to crash rather than predicting it. Overall, 
the evidence suggests some predictive power of implied volatility, but the evidence is less than 
overwhelming.  
Stein (1989) utilizes implied volatility in an entirely different fashion: to examine the 
degree of overreaction. As stated earlier, analyzing the option markets has an important 
advantage over stock markets, in the sense that the only unknown is volatility in option valuation. 
The predictive power of implied volatility is not an assumption in his analysis. Rather he 
assumes mean reversion of volatility, and under mean reversion, long-term traders should react 
to information in a lesser degree than short-term traders19. Stated differently, long-term investors 
are less likely to panic, knowing that in the long term prices and volatility tend to return to their 
normal or sustainable levels. Empirically, he examines the term structure of implied volatilities 
using daily time series of implied volatilities for S&P 100 index options (OEX) over the period 
from December 1983 to September 1987. Based on the assumption that the volatility follows a 
mean reverting process with a constant long-run mean and a constant coefficient of mean 
reversion, changes in long-term implied volatility should be less than those of short-term. 
Empirically, he finds that the movements of long-term and short-term implied volatilities are 
remarkably close. Therefore, he concludes that the results represent evidence for overreaction. 
Diz and Finucane (1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) raise some 
methodological issues in Stein (1989). The study by Diz and Finucane (1993) points out that the 
exact relation between long and short options cannot be constant. They use changes in implied 
                                                 
19 For example, S&P volatility fluctuates centered on 20% under mean-reverting process. If one-month 
option contract’s implied volatility increases to 25%, a two-month (or longer) one should have be lower 
than 25%. Conversely, when the one-month option contract decreases to 15%, the option contract with 
longer time-to-maturity also decreases but to lesser extent. 
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volatilities as opposed to the level of implied volatility and find little evidence of overreactions 
in the S&P 100 stock index. Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) utilize 1998 data of options on 
the European Option Exchange (EOE) index, which consists of the 25 largest stocks in the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. They test restrictions on implied volatilities under the mean 
reverting model, GARCH model and EGARCH model and find that their conclusion about 
overreaction depends on the model specifying the process of price volatility. The EGARCH 
model gives the best description of asset prices and the term structure of options’ implied 
volatilities and suggests little overreaction. On the other hand, assuming mean reverting and 
GARCH models, the evidence is in favor of overreaction. Overall, none of the models is clearly 
mis-specified; as a result, they cannot reach definite conclusions on whether investors overreact 
to information.  
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) develop a theoretical model that predicts initial 
underreactions to new information but eventual overreactions when investors receive a series of 
similar data or information. Poteshman (2001) separates daily changes in instantaneous variance 
into expected and unexpected components and hypothesizes that investors respond to the 
unexpected part when they trade options. The empirical findings indicate that investors in the 
SPX options market underreact to daily information and overreact to consecutive similar daily 
movements. Cao, Li and Yu (2005) examine the S&P 500 index options for the one-year period 
starting September 1993. They estimate that underreaction on average lasts for three trading days, 
and there is some evidence of overreaction associated with consecutive movements of the same 
sign. Our study focuses on the cross-sectional differences in implied volatility changes; we do 
not examine the interplay of overreactions and underreactions over time. 
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With regard to REIT studies related to ours, some papers such as those of Chui, Titman, 
and Wei (2003) and Jung and Glascock (2008) document a momentum effect on REITs. Chui, 
Titman and Wei (2003) use the factor model based on Fama and French (1992) and Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001). They find that the momentum effect is stronger for larger and more liquid 
REITs and is especially strong after 1992. Hung and Glascock (2008) find evidence that REITs’ 
momentum can be explained by both market conditions and dividend growth and that the tax law 
change in 1992 partially explains the greater momentum after 1992. Guo and Huang (2010) use a 
VAR system and find that speculative capital flows to China substantially affects that country’s 
real estate sector. Although these studies do not directly measure overreactions, they suggest that 
REIT valuation is not entirely based on fundamentals. If so, there might be some degree of 
overreactions. 
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IV. Data and Methodology 
Our data consists of daily options prices and trading volume on three ETFs: iShare Dow 
Jones US Real Estate Fund (ticker: IYR), Vanguard REIT Fund (ticker: VNQ), and Standard and 
Poor 500 (ticker: SPY). The sample period starts from 1/10/2005 for IYR and from 9/2/2005 for 
VNQ. The start date of SPY is chosen to match that of IYR, and the data of SPY ends on the end 
of April in 2008. The ETFs VNQ and IYR are our proxies for REITs portfolios whereas SPY is 
used as a proxy for the non-REITs portfolio (the implied volatility from S&P is commonly 
referred to as the VIX index20). It should be emphasized that while there are more than a dozen 
of alternative ETFs that represent the REIT industry,21 the two REIT ETFs here are the most 
liquid ones among the alternative funds. The dataset includes open price, close price, high and 
low prices, bid and ask prices and trading volume for call and put contracts. The data also 
provides daily fund prices. Data on interest rates is obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
web site.  
As in Stein (1989), the short-term series consists of observations from near-the-money 
call and put options with one day up to one month to expiration, and the long-term series consists 
of observations with thirty-one days up to nine months to expiration.22 Admittedly, the term 
difference between the two option series is small; however, the liquidity of longer-term options 
is generally low, which presents difficulties in using the data of longer-term options. To reduce 
noise caused by bid ask bounce, we use the average of bid and ask prices as the proxy for “true” 
                                                 
20 The VIX index is often referred to as the fear gauge, since the index reflects the expected volatility in 
the future. 
21 See appendix C for a list of ETFs on REITs. 
22 Following convention, near-the-money options are defined as those for which the stock price is within 
10% of the exercise price.  
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option price, the data for which is available on all days. To avoid the possibility of including a 
stale quote, we require a day’s trading volume to be non-zero.  
To back out implied volatility from option price, we employ Merton’s (1993) option 
pricing model with continuous dividends; the model basically is the same as Black and Scholes 
(1973), with a dividend adjustment to stock price.   
Stein’s regression-based method is described as follows. Stein (1989) assumes that 
instantaneous volatility, σt evolves according to a continuous-time mean-reverting process. The 
implied volatility at time t on an option with time T remaining is denoted as Vt (T). The 
empirical testing involves two options with different terms to maturities: a short-term option with 
time to expiration T and implied volatility Vs (T) and a long-term option with time to expiration 
K that is n days longer than T (K=T+n) and implied volatility VL (T). 
Stein shows that the following relationship is expected to hold: 
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The notation 2  is the unconditional volatility for which we use the long-term average 
implied volatility as a proxy, ρ is autocorrelation coefficient, and  represents the elasticity of the 
implied volatility of the long-term stock option with respect to that of the short-term option. 
Given a movement in the implied volatility of short-term options Vs (T), there should be a 
smaller movement in the implied volatility of long-term options VL (T). That is, the value of  
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should be less than one. The exact value depends on the mean reversion parameter ρ and 
expiration dates of the two options. Stein performs a regression of long-term implied volatility 
on short-term volatility and finds that the regression coefficient is roughly 0.8-0.9, a number that 
is high enough to indicate overreaction. The coefficient of Vs is our focus because it measures 
the changes of long-term implied volatilities relative to those of short-term.  
More specifically, our main focus is the following equation, using pooled REITs and 
non-REITs data: 
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where a dummy variable, D, is set to one for REITs and zero for non-REITs. The parameter θ1 
represents the response of long-term implied volatility to short-term implied volatility; 
hereinafter, this parameter will be referred to as the response coefficient, which theoretically 
should be less than one under mean reversion. The parameter θ2 captures the difference between 
REITs and non-REITs in terms of the response coefficient. A positive (negative) θ2 indicates that 
REITs (non-REITs) react more strongly to new information. Dollar trading value of the long-
term contract is incorporated in the analysis to control for differential liquidity across time and 
contracts.  
   
 
  
 63 
 
V. Empirical Results 
The time-series patterns of implied volatilities are presented in Figure 1 for SPY, in 
Figure 2 for IYR, and in Figure 3 for VNQ. Each figure shows implied volatilities for long-term 
and short term call options, put options, and averages of call/put options. 
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Figure 1: The time-series patterns of implied volatilities for SPY 
                Implied Volatility for Short-term Call Options                           Implied Volatility for Long-term Call Options 
 
                 Implied Volatility for Short-term Put Options                          Implied Volatility for Long-term Put Options 
 
Implied Volatility for Short-term Average Call/Put Options           Implied Volatility for Long-term Average Call/Put Options 
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Figure 2: The time-series patterns of implied volatilities for IYR 
              Implied Volatility for Short-term Call Options       Implied Volatility for Long-term Call Options 
   
              Implied Volatility for Short-term Put Options         Implied Volatility for Long-term Put Options 
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Figure 3: The time-series patterns of implied volatilities for VNQ 
                Implied Volatility for Short-term Call Options                           Implied Volatility for Long-term Call Options 
 
                 Implied Volatility for Short-term Put Options                          Implied Volatility for Long-term Put Options 
 
Implied Volatility for Short-term Average Call/Put Options           Implied Volatility for Long-term Average Call/Put Options 
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The time-series patterns of implied volatilities show that there is significant volatility 
clustering for each ETF. The movements of implied volatilities of put options tend to be greater 
than those of calls. Also, it is plausible that calls and puts have different clienteles and/or reveal 
different sets of information, and therefore the analyses of calls and puts are separated.23  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the options on the three ETFs. We first 
concentrate on the short-term options. For short-term options on SPY, the mean implied 
volatility is 14.3% for calls and 16.6% for puts. For the two REITs options, the mean implied 
volatility is on average substantially higher than that for SPY. Specifically, for IYR, the 
corresponding implied volatility is 23.5% for calls and is 26.8% for puts; for VNQ, the 
corresponding implied volatilities are 26.3% and 30.2% for calls and puts, respectively. It seems 
apparent that puts tend to be associated with greater implied volatility, which suggests higher 
pricing for puts. A possible explanation for the relative higher pricing for puts is that puts are 
frequently used in portfolio insurance and hedging purposes, implying greater demand relative to 
calls. For the longer contracts, the mean implied volatility is also higher for REIT options than 
that for SPY. The higher average implied volatility for REITs is not surprising because SPY 
represents the broader market that includes many industries and includes many of, if not all, the 
largest firms in the market. Stated differently, SPY represents a much more diversified, less risky 
portfolio than the REIT industry. Also not surprising is the much higher trading in SPY options 
than those of IYR and VNQ. The option market on VNQ is particularly thin, which might make 
it more susceptible to stale pricing and other measurement problems; hence, extra caution should 
be taken with respect to interpreting VNQ results.     
  
                                                 
23 Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, implied volatilities are stationary. 
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Table 1. Statistics of Implied Volatility and Dollar Trading Volume 
This table presents descriptive statistics for implied volatility and the mean of daily trading volume in dollars. The 
sample period starts from 1/10/2005 for IYR and 9/2/2005 for VNQ. The start date of SPY is chosen to match that 
of IYR, and the data of SPY ends on the end of April in 2008.  
  
Implied Volatility Trading Volume in 
Dollars MIN MAX MEAN STD 
Call Options 
SPY      
Short-term 0.0744 0.6144 0.1427 0.0619 $4,019,451 
Long-term 0.0695 0.3018 0.1319 0.0425 $1,158,483 
IYR      
Short-term 0.0626 1.8233 0.2354 0.1332 $72,186 
Long-term 0.1016 0.4673 0.2074 0.0713 $55,929 
VNQ      
Short-term 0.0537 1.6085 0.2626 0.1599 $270 
Long-term 0.0986 7.0758 0.2367 0.2764 $318 
      
Put Options 
SPY      
Short-term 0.0524 0.4361 0.1659 0.0674 $4,633,604 
Long-term 0.0866 0.3845 0.1616 0.0551 $2,263,024 
IYR      
Short-term 0.0930 2.0828 0.2679 0.1427 $168,438 
Long-term 0.1391 0.5263 0.2455 0.0845 $112,464 
VNQ      
Short-term 0.1260 2.7558 0.3017 0.2345 $251 
Long-term 0.0947 0.4561 0.2263 0.0759 $306 
      
Average Value of Call/Put Options 
SPY      
Short-term 0.0826 0.4299 0.1543 0.0612 $4,326,527 
Long-term 0.0855 0.3432 0.1467 0.0469 $1,710,753 
IYR      
Short-term 0.1212 1.4020 0.2516 0.1193 $120,312 
Long-term 0.1236 0.4845 0.2264 0.0752 $84,197 
VNQ      
Short-term 0.1130 1.8494 0.2821 0.1723 $260 
Long-term 0.1160 3.6223 0.2315 0.1513 $312 
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Under volatility mean reversion, long-term traders should be less inclined to trade, 
relative to short-term traders. Therefore, a sector that experiences relatively more trading in long-
term contracts might be overreacting. From this interpretation, the real estate sector might be 
more vulnerable to over-reactions because the results show that, for IYR, dollar trading for long-
term contracts is about 70% of that of short-term contracts, whereas the corresponding ratio for 
SPY is approximately 40%. However, this interpretation does not consider relative pricing: the 
difference between short and long-term implied volatilities is smaller for SPY than those for IYR 
and VNQ; this implies relatively lower pricing for long-term REIT options, which might result in 
relatively more trading. This puts considerable doubt on the use of trading volume to infer 
excessive reactions. Formal testing of excessive reactions follows. 
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Table 2. Regression Analysis of Long-term Implied Volatility on Short-term Implied 
Volatility – for Each ETF 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (2) separately for each ETF (include SPY, IYR, VNQ) without 
the REIT/non-REIT dummy and interaction terms: 
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where      and     represent long-term and short-term implied volatility, and     is the unconditional volatility for 
which we use the long-term average implied volatility as a proxy. Dollar Trading is the trading value of the long-
term option. T-values are reported in parenthesis.
 
The signs *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Independent Variables     Dollar Trading   Adjusted R2 
Call Options 
SPY 0.4953*** 
(30.29)  
1.85E-9*** 
(3.79)  
0.5628 
IYR 0.2547*** 
(16.31)  
1.04E-7*** 
(7.87)  
0.2988 
VNQ 0.2803*** 
(4.29)  
3.07E-5*** 
(4.11)  
0.0549 
      
Put Options 
SPY 0.6028*** 
(29.94)  
4.37E-10 
(1.26)  
0.3378 
IYR 0.3212*** 
(18.46)  
4.61E-8*** 
(6.09)  
0.56 
VNQ 0.0846*** 
(7.05)  
4.73E-6*** 
(3.15)  
0.0814 
      
Average Value of Call/Put Options 
SPY 0.6228*** 
(37.29)  
3.81E-10 
(0.96)  
0.6746 
IYR 0.4090*** 
(22.93)  
8.52E-8*** 
(8.22)  
0.4633 
VNQ 0.3358*** 
(10.76)  
1.317E-5*** 
(3.06)  
0.1635 
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Table 2 shows the results of the regression for each of the ETFs; that is, it shows the 
results of equation (2) separately for each ETF, without the REIT/non-REIT dummy and 
interaction terms. For SPY, the coefficients of long-term response to short-term implied volatility 
changes (response coefficients) are significant at 0.50, 0.60, and 0.62 for calls, puts, and the 
average of calls and puts, respectively. Assuming equation (1) that is based on Stein (1989), the 
“correct” response coefficients (not shown in the table) should be 0.43, 0.51, and 0.52 for calls, 
puts, and their averages, respectively. Therefore, the results on SPY suggest that its option 
market reacts too strongly to new information.24 In contrast, for the two REITs, the response 
coefficients are much smaller. For IYR, the response coefficients are significant at 0.25, 0.32, 
and 0.41 for calls, puts, and their averages, respectively. Nevertheless, these coefficients are also 
higher than the correct response coefficients of 0.24, 0.28, and 0.29 for calls, puts, and averages, 
respectively. For VNQ, the response coefficients are significant at 0.28, 0.08, and 0.34 for calls, 
puts, and their averages. The coefficient for VNQ puts is striking low, further suggesting that 
measurement errors might be greater for VNQ. Their theoretical values are 0.29, 0.22, and 0.23 
for calls, puts, and averages, respectively. The former two actually suggest that VNQ is 
characterized by under-reactions. The mixed results regarding overreaction might be partially 
due to mis-specification of the volatility process. Indeed, Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994)25 
and He, Lee, and Wei (2010) point out that inference regarding overreaction is sensitive to 
volatility specifications. As stated in the introduction, our study differs from existing studies on 
the term structure of implied volatility in one aspect: Our main objective is to compare the 
strength of reactions of two sectors: REITs and non-REITs. Unless specification errors are more 
                                                 
24 These SPY response coefficients are also higher than that in He, Lee and Wei (2010). In that study, they 
find a response coefficient of slightly less than 0.4, which suggests overreactions under the assumption of 
that the volatility process follows GARCH or EGARCH. 
25 The methodology of Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) is described in Appendix D. 
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serious for one of the sectors, they are less critical here than those studies examining the general 
market.  
What is clear from Table 2 is that SPY options are associated with considerably stronger 
responses to information, despite the fact that SPY represents a much more diversified portfolio. 
Formal testing of the difference between SPY and two REIT ETFs are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3 presents the results using equation (2), and the sample is the pooled sample SPY and one 
REIT ETF. Of particular interest is the coefficient of the interaction term: response*dummy, 
where the dummy takes on the value of one for the REIT ETF and zero for SPY. That is, the 
interaction term represents the difference between SPY and REIT ETF. The coefficients of this 
term for the paired sample of SPY and IYR are significant at -0.22, -0.26, and 0.22 for calls, puts, 
and the average of calls and puts, respectively. The corresponding coefficients are the SPY and 
VNQ pair are -0.19, -0.52, and -0.28 for calls, puts, and their averages, respectively. Therefore, 
the evidence clearly indicates that reactions to information are considerably less for REITs than 
for SPY. As discussed in the introduction, the arguments for REITs being a relatively calm 
market are stronger than the arguments against, and the results here support this view. 
Nevertheless, because REIT typically use higher degree of leverage, both at the corporate level 
and at the property level, it is plausible REITs might be particularly vulnerable in down markets, 
thereby making them more susceptible to excessive reactions when investors’ sentiment is 
bearish. To this end, we compare the response coefficients for the worst year and the best year in 
our sample period. Based on the annual returns from the website of National Association of 
REITs, for our sample period, the best year and worst year are 2006 and 2008, respectively. 
Table 4 reports the comparison of the two years. 
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Table 3. Regression Analysis of Long-term Implied Volatility on Short-term Implied 
Volatility -- Pooled Sample 
This table reports the results of testing the difference between SPY and two REIT ETFs by equation (2) and the 
sample is the pooled sample SPY and one REIT ETF: 
t
S
t
S
t
L
t ingDollarTradDDVVV   ***)(*)(*)( 43
2
2
2
1
2
                  
where a dummy variable, D, is set to one for REITs and zero for non-REITs;     and      represent long-term and 
short-term implied volatility, and     is the unconditional volatility for which we use the long-term average implied 
volatility as a proxy. Dollar Trading is the trading value of the long-term option. The parameter θ2 captures the 
difference between REITs and non-REITs in terms of the response coefficient. A positive (negative) θ2 indicates that 
REITs (non-REITs) react more strongly to new information. T-values are reported in parenthesis.
 
The signs *, **, 
*** indicate the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Independent 
Variables 
    D 
Dollar 
Trading 
Adjusted R2 
Call Options 
SPY vs. IYR 0.4895*** 
(27.54) 
-0.2228*** 
(-7.29) 
0.0006 
(0.83) 
2.47E-9*** 
(2.98) 
0.3313 
SPY vs. VNQ 0.4952*** 
(4.66) 
-0.1914* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0004 
(-0.04) 
1.86E-9 
(0.59) 
0.0437 
      
Put Options 
SPY vs. IYR 0.59608*** 
(19.51) 
-0.2601*** 
(-7.8) 
-0.0033 
(-1.13) 
7.56E-10 
(1.44) 
0.393 
SPY vs. VNQ 0.6028*** 
(19.59) 
-0.5169*** 
(-16.09) 
-0.0029 
(-0.9) 
4.38E-10 
(0.83) 
0.2637 
      
Average Value of Call/Put Options 
SPY vs. IYR 0.6127*** 
(21.5) 
-0.2197*** 
(-7.01) 
-0.0037 
(-1.5) 
9.46E-10 
(1.4) 
0.4688 
SPY vs. VNQ 0.6228*** 
(10.5) 
-0.2779*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.0121** 
(-2.19) 
3.84E-10 
(0.27) 
0.208 
            
 
 
Table 4 shows the regression results on IYR and VNQ separately, where the market 
condition dummy is set to be one for 2008 (down market) and zero for 2006 (up market). The 
interaction term, response*dummy, measures how much stronger reactions are in down markets 
relative to up markets. For IYR, the coefficients of the interaction term are significant at 0.53, 
2StV )(*
2StVD
S
tV
L
tV
2
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0.49, and 0.54 for calls, puts, and averages, respectively. These results indicate strikingly 
stronger reactions during down markets.  For VNQ however, the corresponding coefficient for 
call is not significant whereas the coefficients for calls and averages are significantly positive. 
Overall, the evidence suggests stronger reactions during down markets.  
 
Table 4. Regression Analysis of Long-term Implied Volatility on Short-term Implied 
Volatility – Comparison of Up and Down Markets 
This table reports the results of testing the difference between up and down periods for REIT ETFs by equation (2) 
and the sample is the pooled sample of up and down markets for each REIT ETF: 
t
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t
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L
t ingDollarTradDYrDYrVVV   *_*_*)(*)(*)( 43
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where a dummy variable, Yr_D, measures the market condition which is set to be one for 2008 (down market) and 
zero for 2006 (up market);     and     represent long-term and short-term implied volatility, and     is the unconditional 
volatility for which we use the long-term average implied volatility as a proxy. Dollar Trading is the trading value 
of the long-term option. The parameter θ2 captures the difference between down market and up market in terms of 
the response coefficient. A positive (negative) θ2 indicates that down market (up market) react more strongly to new 
information. T-values are reported in parenthesis.
 
The signs *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Independent 
Variables 
  Yr_D 
Dollar 
Trading 
Adjusted R2 
Call Options 
IYR 0.1660** 
(2.5) 
0.5350*** 
(7.89) 
-0.0317*** 
(-5.6) 
2.39E-8 
(1.8) 
0.8425 
VNQ 0.2124 
(1.11) 
0.1511 
(0.75) 
-0.0531 
(-1.6) 
2.78E-5*** 
(3.06) 
0.0899 
      
Put Options 
IYR 0.1022 
(1.04) 
0.4899*** 
(4.9) 
-0.0215** 
(-2.26) 
-7.69E-9** 
(-2.01) 
0.6695 
VNQ -0.0029 
(-0.16) 
0.5665*** 
(21.03) 
-0.0298*** 
(-3.24) 
-7.03E-6 
(-1.31) 
0.6528 
      
Average Value of Call/Put Options 
IYR 0.1576* 
(1.75) 
0.5354*** 
(5.85) 
-0.0233*** 
(-3.48) 
-1.86E-8 
(-3.54) 
0.8069 
VNQ 0.3120*** 
(5.54) 
0.1905*** 
(2.78) 
-0.0293 
(-1.64) 
1.83E-5** 
(2.27) 
0.3255 
            
 
S
tV
L
tV
2
2StV )(*_
2StVDYr
 75 
 
VI. Conclusions      
Using the method of Stein (1989), this study compares the reactions to new information 
in the option markets for REITs and non-REITs. The REIT sector is represented by two REIT 
ETFs (IYR and VNQ) while the non-REIT sector is proxied by the ETF: SPY, and the sample 
period is from 2005 to 2008. Our primary finding is that reactions to information are much 
stronger in the non-REIT sector. The lower reactions in REITs might be explained by several 
valuation and institutional factors, described in the introduction. Moreover, we find that down 
markets are associated with stronger reactions, which we argue might be due to a leverage effect. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Performance comparison chart of S&P 500 Index (^GSPC) with Vanguard REIT Index ETF (VNQ) from 1/2007 to 
4/2009. Source: http://finance.yahoo.com 
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APPENDIX B 
Historical REIT Industry Market Capitalization: 1972-2009 
 
Equity Market Capitalization Outstanding 
(Millions of dollars at year end) 
  
  Composite Equity Mortgage Hybrid 
End of 
Year 
# of 
REIT
s 
Market 
Capitalizatio
n 
# of 
REI
Ts 
Market 
Capitalizatio
n 
# of 
REIT
s 
Market 
Capitalization 
# of 
REIT
s 
Market 
Capitalization 
1971 34 1,494.3 12 332.0 12 570.8 10 591.6 
1972 46 1,880.9 17 377.3 18 774.7 11 728.9 
1973 53 1,393.5 20 336.0 22 517.3 11 540.2 
1974 53 712.4 19 241.9 22 238.8 12 231.7 
1975 46 899.7 12 275.7 22 312.0 12 312.0 
1976 62 1,308.0 27 409.6 22 415.6 13 482.8 
1977 69 1,528.1 32 538.1 19 398.3 18 591.6 
1978 71 1,412.4 33 575.7 19 340.3 19 496.4 
1979 71 1,754.0 32 743.6 19 377.1 20 633.3 
1980 75 2,298.6 35 942.2 21 509.5 19 846.8 
1981 76 2,438.9 36 977.5 21 541.3 19 920.1 
1982 66 3,298.6 30 1,071.4 20 1,133.4 16 1,093.8 
1983 59 4,257.2 26 1,468.6 19 1,460.0 14 1,328.7 
1984 59 5,085.3 25 1,794.5 20 1,801.3 14 1,489.4 
1985 82 7,674.0 37 3,270.3 32 3,162.4 13 1,241.2 
1986 96 9,923.6 45 4,336.1 35 3,625.8 16 1,961.7 
1987 110 9,702.4 53 4,758.5 38 3,161.4 19 1,782.4 
1988 117 11,435.2 56 6,141.7 40 3,620.8 21 1,672.6 
1989 120 11,662.2 56 6,769.6 43 3,536.3 21 1,356.3 
1990 119 8,737.1 58 5,551.6 43 2,549.2 18 636.3 
1991 138 12,968.2 86 8,785.5 28 2,586.3 24 1,596.4 
1992 142 15,912.0 89 11,171.1 30 2,772.8 23 1,968.1 
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1993 189 32,158.7 135 26,081.9 32 3,398.5 22 2,678.2 
1994 226 44,306.0 175 38,812.0 29 2,502.7 22 2,991.3 
1995 219 57,541.3 178 49,913.0 24 3,395.4 17 4,232.9 
1996 199 88,776.3 166 78,302.0 20 4,778.6 13 5,695.8 
1997 211 140,533.8 176 127,825.3 26 7,370.3 9 5,338.2 
1998 210 138,301.4 173 126,904.5 28 6,480.7 9 4,916.2 
1999 203 124,261.9 167 118,232.7 26 4,441.7 10 1,587.5 
2000 189 138,715.4 158 134,431.0 22 1,632.0 9 2,652.4 
2001 182 154,898.6 151 147,092.1 22 3,990.5 9 3,816.0 
2002 176 161,937.3 149 151,271.5 20 7,146.4 7 3,519.4 
2003 171 224,211.9 144 204,800.4 20 14,186.51 7 5,225.0 
2004 193 307,894.7 153 275,291.0 33 25,964.32 7 6,639.37 
2005 197 330,691.3 152 301,490.9 37 23,393.73 8 5,806.61 
2006 183 438,071.1 138 400,741.4 38 29,195.3 7 8,134.3 
2007 152 312,009.0 118 288,694.6 29 19,054.1 5 4,260.3 
2008 136 191,651.0 113 176,237.7 20 14,280.5 3 1,132.9 
2009 142 271,199.2 115 248,355.2 23 22,103.2 4 740.8 
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APPENDIX C 
REIT Exchange Traded Funds 
Company Name Ticker 
Adelante Shares RE Classics ETF   ACK 
Adelante Shares RE Composite ETF   ACB 
Adelante Shares RE Growth ETF   AGV 
Adelante Shares RE Kings ETF   AKB 
Adelante Shares RE Shelter ETF   AQS 
Adelante Shares RE Value ETF   AVU 
Adelante Shares RE Yield Plus ETF   ATY 
iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate ex-US Index Fund   IFGL 
iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Asia Index Fund   IFAS 
iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe Index Fund   IFEU 
iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT North America Index Fund   IFNA 
iShares Cohen & Steers Realty Majors Index Fund   ICF 
iShares Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate Index Fund   IYR 
streetTRACKS Wilshire REIT Index Fund   RWR 
Vanguard REIT VIPERS   VNQ 
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APPENDIX D 
The methodology of Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) can more precisely determine 
whether the results represent overreactions. Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) model the 
evolution in volatility using GARCH and EGARCH processes. Under the GARCH (1, 1) process: 
  ttt rR     
  2 12
2
110
2
  ttt   
 
where Rt is the daily stock return, σt is the stock return volatility at time t, r is the risk-free rate, λ 
represents a risk premium, and εt is Gaussian white noise. The relationship between expected 
volatilities differing in time to maturity is shown as:  
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Under the EGARCH (1,1) specification, return and volatility follow: 
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It is shown that, under this model for volatility, the relation between long-term implied volatility 
and short-term implied volatility is described by: 
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The parameter estimates using GARCH (1, 1) and EGARCH (1, 1) are given in the following 
table. It is notable that the coefficients of all volatility terms are statistically significant in all 
models. Volatility shocks appear to have persistent impacts for SPDR S&P 500 ETF, iShares 
Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate ETF, and Vanguard REIT ETF. 
Parameter Estimates under GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) 
 SPY  IYR  VNQ 
GARCH(1,1) Coefficient  
Standard 
Error  Coefficient  
Standard 
Error  Coefficient  
Standard 
Error 
volitility (λ) -6.6079 *** 0.9493  -2.0047 *** 0.347  4.6058 *** 0.7228 
ARCH0 (α0) 1.32E-06 
*** 4.73E-07  2.17E-06 ** 8.90E-07  1.62E-06 * 0.0134 
ARCH1 (α1) 0.0719 
*** 0.0152  0.0724 *** 0.0159  0.0604 *** 0.0134 
GARCH1 (α2) 0.9103 
*** 0.0178  0.9171 *** 0.0174  0.9325 *** 0.0143 
γ =α1 + α2 0.9822    0.9895    0.9929   
AIC -5690.54    -4714.90    -3854.51   
EGARCH(1,1)            
volitility (λ) -11.3196 *** 1.9551  -2.0059 *** 0.002991  3.8859 *** 1.4346 
EARCH0 (α0) -0.1867 
* 0.0968  -0.1209 ** 0.0612  -0.1273 ** 0.0592 
EARCH1 (α2) 0.1159 
*** 0.0248  0.1296 *** 0.0323  0.1088 *** 0.0347 
EGARCH1 (α1) 0.9801 
*** 0.0248  0.986 *** 0.006978  0.9852 *** 0.006838 
THETA (α3) -1.8876 
*** 0.4164  -0.5005 *** 0.1793  -0.5171 * 0.2648 
γ =α1  0.9801    0.986    0.9852   
AIC -5540.03    -4714.90    -3703.67   
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